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THE REGULATION OF CONTRACTUAL
CHANGE: A GUIDE TO NO ORAL
MODIFICATION CLAUSES FOR NORTH
CAROLINA LAWYERS
MARTIN H. BRINKLEY
The fundamental reason parties make contracts, and an
underlying purpose of contract law, is to prevent change. From
the viewpoint of the parties, the benefit of negotiating and
executing a written agreement lies in securing the terms of the deal
so that neither party can alter the agreement unilaterally without
having to compensate the other side. For many years parties have
sought to seal their bargain further by incorporating clauses that
purport to prohibit oral modifications or waivers of the
agreement's terms.
The law that has developed around these "no oral modification"
and "no oral waiver" clauses, both in North Carolina and other
states, is counterintuitive and has proved confusing to practicing
lawyers and their clients alike. Rarely negotiated, the clauses are
frequently struck down at common law because they unduly
foreclose the parties' ability to bring about contractual change.
Judges faced with particular factual situations, moreover, deploy
the doctrines of waiver and estoppel to allow enforcement of
contractual changes even when the agreement contains "no oral
modification" or "no oral waiver" clauses. The failure of the
North Carolina courts to use the terms "waiver," "modification,"
and "estoppel" distinctly and consistently poses an additional
challenge to lawyers seeking to understand the law of contractual
change and counsel clients appropriately.
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This Article attempts to describe and clarify North Carolina law
on the enforceability of "no oral modification" and "no oral
waiver" clauses. It traces the development of applicable North
Carolina case law and addresses certain practical problems that
arise when the clauses are employed indiscriminately. The Article
concludes with a proposal for statutory reform that would offer
predictability to parties seeking to prevent unintended contractual
changes while affording flexibility to judges concerned about
achieving fair results in individual cases.
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I. THE MYSTERY OF NOM CLAUSES
Provisions that forbid oral modification or oral waiver of a
written agreement-so-called "no oral modification" and "no oral
waiver" clauses' (referred to here as "NOM" and "NOW" clauses)-
are almost as commonplace as written contracts themselves.2 In a
simple contract, a combined NOM and NOW clause might read:
"This Agreement cannot be amended, modified or waived except by
1. The difference between NOM and NOW clauses is the same as the difference
between modification and waiver. They are independent concepts in contract law. See
infra Part II (suggesting definitions for "waiver," "modification," and "estoppel").
Because few published cases deal with NOW clauses in North Carolina, this Article's
primary focus is on NOM clauses, although many of the applicable principles and
problems are the same.
2. A survey conducted in a law firm database of thirty randomly selected form
agreements covering a wide array of factual circumstances failed to disclose a single
agreement that did not contain a NOM or NOW clause, or both. The clauses are equally
common in preprinted form documents (such as bank form loan documents) and in
documents prepared by other law firms.
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a written instrument signed on behalf of the party to be charged," or
"No purported modification of this agreement or waiver of any
provision of this agreement shall be binding upon X unless such
modification or waiver shall be evidenced by a writing signed by X."
In a more complex document, the clause might read:
No amendment or waiver of any provision of this Agreement,
the Notes or any of the other Loan Documents, nor consent to
any departure by any of the Loan Parties therefrom, shall in
any event be effective unless the same shall be in writing and
signed by each of the Loan Parties party to such Loan
Document and directly affected by such amendment, waiver or
consent and signed by the Lenders, and then such waiver or
consent shall be effective only in the specific instance and for
the specific purpose for which given.
Both the breadth and the precision of the language used in
conventional NOM and NOW clauses are limited only by the
ingenuity of the lawyers who draft them. But the underlying
motivation is always the same: parties who have labored (especially
parties who have paid lawyers to labor) over a complicated written
agreement want that agreement to be the complete and perpetual
embodiment of their commitments. The goal is contractual certainty,
which may be worth a great deal at the inception of a new business
relationship. Should a change be needed, parties who have only
recently begun dealing with each other will want the change to be
brokered at the negotiating table and reduced to writing, in the same
way as the original agreement. They do not want deviations from the
letter of the agreement that may arise in the course of the other
party's performance to effect a wholesale change in the contract,
particularly a change that a court might enforce in the other party's
favor. The purpose of a written contract, from the parties'
perspective, is to lock in the deal and foreclose the possibility of
informally achieved changes.3 For these reasons, business people and
3. See generally David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change:
Public and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WiS. L.
REV. 607 (1999) (providing a comprehensive and penetrating discussion of the tension
between certainty and flexibility in contract law, as reflected in statutory and contractual
efforts to regulate modification, waiver, and estoppel). This Article owes much to
Professor Snyder's analysis, particularly his discussion of the true meaning of the terms
"waiver," "modification," and "estoppel." See id. at 624-29; see also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 41-42
(1998) (suggesting that concepts of expectation and reliance, so long dominant in contract
law, may have led to ignoring other important considerations, such as certainty and
flexibility).
2003] 2241
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
their lawyers view the ever-present NOM and NOW clauses as a
source of comfort: "At least we can be sure," they think, "that the
agreement we have signed is the only one we have to worry about
until we decide to write up a new one."
The difficulty is that contracts are meant to be performed; parties
do not always feel the same warm assurance about NOM and NOW
clauses one or two years after the execution of an agreement that they
felt at outset of the relationship. By then, the lawyers have moved on
to other matters and the business people have "booked" the contract
on the firm's financial statements. Performing the contract has
become the task of salespeople, manufacturers' representatives,
general contractors and subcontractors, or middle management.
Changes in the parties' business needs inevitably arise, and when they
do, the charms of contractual certainty that seemed so alluring at the
closing table will have faded. Confronted with the practical
challenges of contract performance, parties may pursue an opposing
array of values: pliancy, flexibility, and the ability to change the deal
informally. Is it really worth going back to the drafting table to make
a "technical" change? It is this tension between flexibility and
reliance, this antithesis between contract and change,4 that has led to
the difficulties raised by NOM and NOW clauses in litigated cases.
This Article has four goals. First, it seeks to bring to light the
heart of the thorny problem that NOM and NOW clauses present:
the tension between the quest for certainty and the need for flexibility
in the world of business relationships and the law of contracts (Parts I
and II). Second, the Article attempts to impose a measure of
analytical order on the perplexing array of judicial opinions
emanating from the North Carolina appellate courts that have dealt
directly with NOM or NOW clauses or the related concepts of waiver,
modification, and estoppel (Parts III and IV).' Third, the Article
brings to the attention of North Carolina lawyers various practical
ramifications of the use of NOM and NOW clauses (Parts V and VI).
Finally, the Article proposes a legislative solution that gives
contracting parties a freer hand in forging the rules that will govern
their business relationship while affording courts a means of
achieving fair results under particularized facts. Although the intent
4. See Snyder, supra note 3, at 636-39 (articulating the concept of an antithesis
between contract (certainty) and change (flexibility)).
5. Cf Robert A. Hillman, Standards for Revising Article 2 of the UCC: The NOM
Clause Model, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1509, 1522 (1994) (suggesting that "principles
such as freedom of contract and fairness do not help us find our way out of the forest of
NOM clauses") [hereinafter Hillman, Standards].
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of parties who include a NOM or NOW clause in a written agreement
should be respected, giving NOM and NOW clauses full legal effect
under all factual circumstances inevitably will result in substantial
injustice where a party has reasonably and materially changed its
position in good faith reliance on an oral amendment. In the interest
of fairness, the law must accommodate both of these concerns while
avoiding the uncertainty that has plagued this field of contract law.
The legislative solution proposed here6 attempts to strike a
compromise between the parties' competing desires for both certainty
and flexibility in their contractual relationships.
Perhaps because they are ubiquitous,7 NOM and NOW clauses
have acquired a sort of invisibility to lawyers and their clients.
Business lawyers who have practiced for decades may not be able to
recall a single occasion when a NOM or NOW clause was even
touched upon in contract negotiations. In their efforts to anticipate
every contingency and to memorialize the parties' business deal as
accurately as possible, competent transactional lawyers ignore NOM
and NOW clauses just as they do many of the other "boilerplate"
terms that are often found near the end of the contract document.
Such provisions are, understandably, the last of their worries. What
harm can it do to say that the agreement may only be amended or
modified in writing? NOM and NOW clauses are easily agreed upon
6. Neither the idea nor the specific language of the proposal is original. See Snyder,
supra note 3, at 656 n.233 (proposing specific legislative enactments dealing with NOM
clauses). As discussed in Part VII below, the text of the legislation recommended here is
almost entirely Professor Snyder's, who in turn notes that he "did not make up these
sections from scratch." Id. Professor Snyder states that his proposed statute reflects
"revised draft provisions that had already received careful attention" from study groups
and drafting committees of the UCC Permanent Editorial Board and their reporters. Id.
7. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. One Practicing Law Institute manuscript
suggests that a NOM clause should be included in "every commercial agreement," and
goes so far as to state that allegations of purported breach of an oral amendment to an
agreement containing a NOM clause "cannot withstand a dispositive motion unless the
party claiming reliance on the [alleged oral] 'agreement' can point to some conduct or
detrimental reliance 'unequivocally referable' to the alleged amendment." Brad S. Karp,
The Litigation Angle in Drafting Commercial Contracts, in 2000-01 PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, DRAFTING CORP. AGREEMENTS ANNUAL HANDBOOK 489, 494 (Ronald B.
Risdom & Maryann A. Waryjas eds., 2001). For the reasons stated in Part VI infra, this
statement is too broad. Cf James P. Nehf, Writing Contracts in the Client's Interest, 51
S.C. L. REV. 153, 159 (1999) ("A careful drafter should consider whether the client is
likely ... to abide by the requirement of getting a written modification when one does
occur. If the client's goals are hindered by the NOM clause, it should not be included.").
The requirement that detrimental reliance be "unequivocably referable" to an amendment
is the standard in New York for proving an exception to section 15-301(1) of New York
General Obligations Law, which validates NOM clauses. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 15-301(l) (McKinney 2001). This standard is difficult to meet in litigation.
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and usually overlooked as the lawyers and their clients focus on
securing the business terms firmly within the document.
For written contracts that are entered into in the ordinary course
of business, the parties' consideration of NOM and NOW clauses
rarely goes beyond a cursory review. But for more complex
transactions that require opinion letters from counsel, the matter is
thrown into a different light. Lawyers representing parties in these
transactions are often asked to render the opinion that the
transactions are enforceable in accordance with their terms, subject to
certain exceptions. For opinions rendered by careful North Carolina
lawyers, one of those exceptions is likely to be the enforceability of
the NOM or NOW clause.
According to the Legal Opinion Committee of the Business Law
Section of the North Carolina Bar Association, NOM and NOW
clauses are potentially unenforceable under North Carolina law.8 The
Committee's 1999 report, Third Party Legal Opinions in Business
Transactions, suggests that North Carolina lawyers opining on the
enforceability of agreements containing NOM or NOW clauses
should include in their lists of exceptions to the standard formulation
of the enforceability opinion (sometimes referred to as the
"remedies" opinion) the following statement: "We do not express an
opinion as to the enforceability of ... any provisions of the
Agreement that require waivers or amendments to be made only in
writing."9  The Committee's commentary on this suggestion cites
three North Carolina Court of Appeals decisions, introducing the
citation with the modifying signal "see, e.g.," which indicates there is
additional North Carolina appellate case law standing for the
proposition that NOM and NOW clauses are unenforceable. °
8. Third Party Legal Opinions in Business Transactions, REP. LEGAL OPINION
COMMITTEE (N.C. Bar Assoc./Bus. L. Sec., Cary, N.C.), Jan. 1, 1990, § 10.2.d, at 44
[hereinafter NC. Legal Opinion Report].
9. Id.; see also Third-Party Legal Opinion Report Including the Legal Opinion
Accord 28-29,47 BUS. LAW 167 (American Bar Assoc. Committee on Legal Opinions ed.,
1991.) (stating that the "general principles of equity" limitation included in the remedies
opinion "covers the effect of judicially developed rules concerning the manner and
continuing effect of waivers and modification, notwithstanding a provision in a contract
requiring written waivers and modifications").
10. N.C. Legal Opinion Report § 10.2.d, at 44 (holding that parol agreements may
waive or modify contracts with NOM or NOW clauses) (citing Son-Shine Grading, Inc. v.
ADC Constr. Co., 68 N.C. App. 417, 422-23, 315 S.E.2d 346, 349-50 (1984)); Triangle Air
Conditioning, Inc. v. Caswell County Bd. of Educ., 57 N.C. App. 482, 488, 291 S.E.2d 808,
812 (1982) (holding that parties may waive the terms of a contract by their conduct); W.E.
Garrison Grading Co. v. Piracci Constr. Co., 27 N.C. App. 725, 729, 221 S.E.2d 512, 515
(1975) (holding that conduct or a later parol agreement may modify the terms of a
previously written contract)).
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When drafting an opinion letter addressing the enforceability of
a written agreement governed by North Carolina law, or when
negotiating an agreement drafted by other counsel that will be
governed by North Carolina law, a lawyer should indicate that any
NOM or NOW clauses included in the agreement may be
unenforceable. More often than not, this disclosure leaves opposing
counsel silent and bewildered." A faxed copy of Son-Shine Grading,
Inc. v. ADC Construction Co.,12 one of the more recent modern North
Carolina appellate cases on the enforceability of NOM and NOW
clauses, typically produces more silence, although it usually has the
salutary effect of squelching opposition to including an appropriate
exception in the enforceability opinion. The pressure of rendering an
opinion letter in connection with a rushed closing rarely affords the
lawyers an opportunity to examine the clauses in meaningful detail.
At least three reasons explain the bar's confusion over NOM and
NOW clauses. First, the notion that NOM and NOW clauses are
unenforceable is counterintuitive to both transactional and litigation
lawyers, who are steeped in the theory and culture of freedom of
contract. 3 It seems natural for parties to attempt to make their
contract impervious to oral modification. Why should parties whom
the law broadly permits to frame the terms of their own bargain not
be allowed to control how a painstakingly drafted agreement can be
modified or amended, or how specific clauses of that agreement can
be waived? If the parties are prepared to take the trouble of putting
into writing an agreement that is not legally required to be so
memorialized in order to be enforceable, should they not be allowed
to require amendments, modifications, and waivers to be in writing as
well? Should not the law encourage the precision and caution that
follows from putting contracts of all types into writing? Won't a
writing provide evidence that will help the parties repel mistaken or
fraudulent attacks on their written agreement?1
4
Second, North Carolina law on the enforceability of NOM and
NOW clauses, like the law of some other states and federal
11. Cf. Snyder, supra note 3, at 639 ("A few modern lawyers, and certainly many of
their clients, would be surprised to learn that the treatment of NOM and NOW clauses
under the common law has not changed much.").
12. 68 N.C. App. 417,315 S.E.2d 346 (1984).
13. Cf. Snyder, supra note 3, at 639 ("This rule [that NOM and NOW clauses are
unenforceable at common law] may seem odd, especially in contract law, which devotes
much of its energy to giving effect to parties' agreements.").
14. Professor Lon Fuller observed that legal formalities serve an evidentiary function
in that they provide evidence of the purpose and meaning of a contract. See Lon L. Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941).
2003] 2245
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jurisdictions, is undeveloped and confused. 5 Despite attempts to
analyze the basic principles that affect the enforceability of NOM
clauses, North Carolina appellate courts have not resolved the most
basic questions. For example, it is unclear whether NOM clauses are
always unenforceable as a blanket proposition. The lawyer must first
consider whether the agreement in question is within the various
scattered provisions of North Carolina's Statute of Frauds' 6 -a
familiar public policy that renders certain classes of agreements
unenforceable unless they are reduced to writing and signed by the
party to be bound-or whether the agreement is a contract for the
sale or lease of goods governed by Articles 217 or 2A' 8 of the North
Carolina Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").
Finally, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which has been the
almost exclusive source of applicable case law over the last four
decades, has not distinguished carefully between written agreements
that are within the Statute of Frauds and those that are outside it.19
Nor has the court of appeals articulated the rationale supporting the
15. See Autotrol Corp. v. Cont'l Water Sys. Corp., 918 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1990)
(applying Texas law); Wisconsin Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th
Cir. 1986) (applying Wisconsin law); Estate of Connelly v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 815
(D.N.J. 1975), ajTd 551 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1977); Orient Ins. Co. v. McKnight, 64 N.E. 339
(I1l. 1902); Copeland v. Hewett, 53 A. 36 (Me. 1902); Bartlett v. Stanchfield, 19 N.E. 549
(Mass. 1899) (Holmes, J.); Beebe v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 53 N.W. 818 (Mich. 1892);
Headley v. Cavileer, 82 A. 908, 910 (N.J. 1912); Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co.,
122 N.Y. 378, 381 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.); Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1 (N.Y. 1908), affd 95
N.E. 1125 (1911); Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin County Convention
Facilities Auth., 678 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio 1997); Wagner v. Graziano Constr. Co., 136 A.2d
82 (Pa. 1957); Mix v. Royal Ins. Co., 32 A. 460 (Pa. 1895); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v.
Whetzel, 65 N.E. 15, 17 (Ind. App. 1902); Ross-Langford v. Mercantile Town Ins. Co., 71
S.W. 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902); Smaldone v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 N.Y.S. 201 (App. Div.
1897).
16. For a non-exclusive list of items governed by the North Carolina Statute of
Frauds, see infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text. As discussed in Part V below,
modifications of contracts that are within the Statute of Frauds must likewise satisfy the
Statute to be enforceable. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(1) (2001).
18. Id. § 25-2A-201(l)(b).
19. The court of appeals has simply applied Article 2's separate rule regarding the
efficacy of oral modifications to contracts for the sale of goods to which Article 2 applies.
The court has applied the common law rule of unenforceability in non-UCC cases. There
has been no effort-perhaps because the court thought it unnecessary-to clarify overtly
which rule applies where. Compare, e.g., Mulberry-Fairplains Water Ass'n v. Town of N.
Wilkesboro, 105 N.C. App. 258, 265-66, 412 S.E.2d 910, 915 (1992) (holding that a
contract for the sale of water constitutes a sale of goods governed by Article 2), and
Varnell v. Henry M. Milgrom, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 451, 453, 337 S.E.2d 616, 617-18 (1985)
(applying Article 2 to an output contract for the sale of peanuts), with Shields, Inc. v.
Metric Constructors, Inc., 106 N.C. App. 365, 370, 416 S.E.2d 597, 600 (1992) (applying
common law rule to construction contract).
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rule. Instead, the court has quoted from equally unhelpful opinions
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.2 ° Some of the more
illuminating supreme court cases involve subject matter that today
would be governed by Article 2 of the UCC, casting doubt on their
value as precedent. Theories of waiver, modification, and estoppel
are sometimes asserted in judicial opinions," but North Carolina
courts rarely have articulated clear reasons for the results they have
reached.
II. WAIVER, MODIFICATION, AND ESTOPPEL: SOME ATTEMPTS AT
A WORKABLE DEFINITION
The most challenging aspect of understanding the law of NOM
and NOW clauses arises from the failure of judges to define
consistently the salient terms that frame the analysis in their opinions.
These terms are "waiver," "modification," and "estoppel." Judges
regularly employ, but rarely define, the term "waiver." Professor
Corbin's simile is memorable: "The term waiver is one of those
words of indefinite connotation in which our legal literature abounds;
like a cloak, it covers a multitude of sins."22  Another similarly
overused and abused word is "estoppel."23  "Courts may use such
words to reach fair results, but undisciplined use of the terms has led
to a swamp of muddy thinking."24 Dean Roscoe Pound called terms
like waiver, modification, and estoppel "solving words [that] are but
substitutes for thought.... [W]hat enables them to endure is a
convenient elasticity and vagueness of outline that gives a certain play
20. See J.R. Graham & Son, Inc. v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 25 N.C. App. 163,
167-68, 212 S.E.2d 542, 544-45 (1975); Fishel & Taylor v. Grifton United Methodist
Church, 9 N.C. App. 224, 227, 175 S.E.2d 785, 786 (1970). Both cases cite Supreme Court
of North Carolina decisions that are discussed in this Article. See infra notes 99-107 and
accompanying text (discussing Allen Bros. v. Raleigh Say. Bank, 180 N.C. 608, 105 S.E. 401
(1920)); infra notes 108-25 and accompanying text (discussing Whitehurst v. FCX Fruit &
Vegetable Serv., 224 N.C. 628, 32 S.E.2d 34 (1944)); infra notes 129-40 and accompanying
text (discussing Childress v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, 247 N.C. 150, 100 S.E.2d 391
(1957)).
21. Compare H.M. Wade Mfg. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 204 N.C. 449, 453, 168 S.E. 517, 519
(1933) (referring to concepts of waiver and modification without clear differentiation),
with Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417,426-27, 293 S.E.2d 749, 755-56
(1982) (acknowledging confusion between concepts of waiver and estoppel in earlier
Supreme Court of North Carolina cases).
22. Snyder, supra note 3, at 624 n.81 (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the
Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 754 (1919) (citation omitted)).
23. "What Corbin said about 'waiver,' Williston said about 'estoppel.' " Snyder, supra
note 3, at 624 n.82 (citing American Law Institute, Proceedings at Fourth Annual Meeting,
4 A.L.I. Proc. App. at 90-106 (1926)).
24. Snyder, supra note 3, at 625 n.83.
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to the judicial instinct while preserving the appearance of rigid logical
deduction. ' 25 Courts are hardly the only sinners: scholars, sometimes
in a good faith effort to eliminate murkiness, have introduced phrases
such as "waiver-estoppel"26 and "reliance waiver '27 that seem, at least
to the practitioner, only to further obfuscate the terms.
North Carolina judicial decisions in the field of contract law have
done little to bring clarity to this morass of slipshod reasoning.
Opinions from the early twentieth century are the worst culprits. A
1933 Supreme Court of North Carolina decision cited repeatedly
through the 1970s (and which is further cited in the North Carolina
commentary to section 2-209 of the UCC) employed the words
"modified," "set aside," "rescinded," "waived," "abandoned," and
"waiver" in a single paragraph while citing a treatise on "estoppel. ',28
Although the North Carolina courts have made conscientious efforts
in a few recent cases to draw careful doctrinal distinctions between
waiver, modification, and estoppel, 29 a rigorous treatment of the
concepts in judicial opinions remains elusive. The discussion that
follows is an effort to redress this uncertainty.
It would be pointless to cite all of the numerous North Carolina
cases that define "waiver" as "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right."30  The formulaic use of this
25. Roscoe Pound, Foreword to JOHN S. EWART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED AMONG
THE DEPARTMENTS: ELECTION, ESTOPPEL, CONTRACT, RELEASE iii, v (1917).
26. Beth A. Eisler, Modification of Sales Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: Section 2-209 Reconsidered, 57 TENN. L. REV. 401, 434 (1990). Justice Exum used
the phrase "waiver by estoppel" in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417,
427, 293 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1982), discussed infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
27. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.6,
at 41 (4th ed. 1995).
28. H.M. Wade Mfg. Co. v. Lefkowitz, 204 N.C. 449, 453-54, 168 S.E. 517, 518-19
(1933), cited in, e.g., Salem Towne Apartments., Inc. v. McDaniel & Sons Roofing Co., 330
F. Supp. 906, 911 (E.D.N.C. 1970); J.R. Graham & Son, Inc. v. Randolph County Bd. of
Educ., 25 N.C. App. 163, 167, 212 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1975); Fishel & Taylor v. Grifton
United Methodist Church, 9 N.C. App. 224, 227, 175 S.E.2d 785,786 (1970); see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 2-209 N.C. cmt. (2001) (citing Lefkowitz, 204 N.C. at 453-54,168 S.E. at 518-19).
29. Justice Exum's opinion in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417,
425-28, 293 S.E.2d 749, 754-56 (1982), discussed infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text,
is an outstanding example of one justice's struggle with the problem of rigorous
terminology in the areas of waiver and estoppel. Another useful treatment is Justice
Sharp's opinion in Lenoir Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Stancil, 263 N.C. 630, 633-34, 139 S.E.2d
901, 903-04 (1965).
30. See, e.g., Davenport v. Travelers Indem. Co., 283 N.C. 234, 239, 195 S.E.2d 529,
533 (1973) (defining waiver); see also Clemmons v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 267 N.C.
495, 504, 148 S.E.2d 640, 647 (1966) (same); Fetner v. Rocky Mount Marble & Granite
Works, 251 N.C. 296, 302, 111 S.E.2d 324, 328 (1959) (stating that the elements of waiver
are (1) the existence of a right, advantage or benefit at the time of the waiver; (2) the
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to
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definition in judicial opinions is so ubiquitous that the phrase has
almost become an incantation for practicing lawyers. The definition
is misleading, however, because it reveals nothing about the quantum
of intention and purposefulness required to establish a waiver in
North Carolina. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has suggested
that a waiver can be inferred from a party's conduct-but how much
conduct, and of what kind? A useful example of inferring a waiver
from conduct is H.M. Wade Manufacturing Co. v. Lefkowitz,31 a case
that today would likely be decided under section 2-209(4) of the
UCC.
3 2
In Lefkowitz, a retail merchant bought fixtures for his store from
a manufacturer.33 The merchant and the manufacturer entered into a
written agreement providing that the merchant's use of the fixtures
for a period of five days after delivery would constitute an acceptance
of the fixtures and that all claims for damages, errors, or shortages not
filed within that period of time (the so-called "drop dead period")
would be waived.34 When the merchant reported a number of
product defects to the manufacturer after the "drop dead" period had
elapsed, the manufacturer's sales representative visited the merchant
several times and made repeated promises that the fixtures would be
repaired.3 5 The Supreme Court of North Carolina ordered a new trial
on the issue of whether the sales representative's conduct was "of
such a nature and quality as to warrant an inference of waiver or
intention to waive" the "drop dead" period for notifying the
manufacturer of defects.36 The lack of a generally accepted definition
of "waiver" has been complicated by the court's failure to recognize
relinquish such right, advantage or benefit); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 84 cmt. b (1981) (defining waiver); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining waiver).
31. 204 N.C. 449, 168 S.E. 517 (1933).
32. The contract at issue involved a sale of goods and related installation services. Id.
For a discussion of North Carolina state and federal court cases applying Article 2 of the
UCC to cases involving mixed contracts for goods and services, see JOHN N. HUTSON, JR.
& SCOTT A. MISKIMON, NORTH CAROLINA CONTRACT LAW § 6-5-2(A), at 454-55 (2001
& Supp. 2003) [hereinafter HUTSON & MISKIMON]. The North Carolina commentary
suggests that section 2-209(4) "would seem to be in accord with prior law in North
Carolina." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-209 N.C. cmt. (2001) (citing, inter alia, Lefkowitz, 204
N.C. at 449, 168 S.E. at 517).
33. Lefkowitz, 204 N.C. at 453, 168 S.E. at 518.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 453-54,168 S.E. at 518-19; cf. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bimco Iron
& Metal Corp., 464 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. 1971) (inferring from an insurance adjuster's
attempt to settle a claim that the insurer had waived the condition requiring the insured to
file timely proof of loss).
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in some instances the presence of consideration or reliance as a
contributing factor in the court's analysis.
The North Carolina courts are not alone in failing to apply clear
definitions. The problem is common to state courts across the
country but received little scholarly attention until Professor David
Snyder, in a penetrating 1999 article, illuminated the issue by
proposing workable definitions of "waiver," "modification," and
"estoppel."37  Professor Snyder's proposed definitions are helpful
because they emphasize the various modes of conduct that lead to
different legal results. He defines the terms as follows:
1. A "waiver" results from a unilateral act dispensing with a
contractual condition.
2. A "modification" results from an agreement to change a
preexisting contract.
3. An "estoppel" results when the conduct of one party induces
cognizable reliance by the other party so that in justice the first
party is precluded from contradicting its earlier conduct.38
Each of these definitions deserves further discussion and comparison
with the concepts applied in North Carolina common law decisions.
A. Waiver
Professor Snyder's definition of "waiver" is considerably
narrower than the definition the Supreme Court of North Carolina
has employed. That is the essence of its appeal. Under his definition,
only the unilateral act of one party can constitute a waiver. No action
is needed on the part of the person who benefits from the waiver.
Agreement, consideration, and reliance are not required. "A waiver
cannot create duties for the waiving party or discharge the non-
waiving party's promise."39  Professor Snyder says waivers are,
therefore, traditionally "restricted to conditions that are 'procedural
or technical,' or at least 'comparatively minor.' "40
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's efforts to define
"waiver" suggest that the meaning of the term, at least as it is used in
37. See Snyder, supra note 3.
38. Snyder, supra note 3, at 626.
39. Snyder, supra note 3, at 626-27.
40. Snyder, supra note 3, at 626 (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 84(1) cmts. a, d (1981) (discussing "waiver of a defense not addressed to the
merits" and minor conditions, respectively)).
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North Carolina, is broader and ultimately harder to pin down than
Professor Snyder's straightforward formulation. One of the court's
more intellectually honest attempts to acknowledge the myriad and
confusing ways in which the term "waiver" can be used is Justice
Exum's opinion in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish.4 In that
case, Mike Rubish entered into a ten-year lease for an undeveloped
parcel of land on which he built golf, dining, and other entertainment
facilities.4" The agreement granted Rubish an option to extend the
lease term for six additional five-year periods, with escalating rent
during each extension term. 3 Rubish could extend the term by giving
the owner " 'written notice of his intention to do so not later than
ninety (90) days prior to the expiration of the then current term of
[the] lease.' "" When the owner died, the fee interest in the property
was devised to a trust with Wachovia Bank and Trust Company as the
named trustee.45 Although the trustee was unable to find a writing
from Rubish to the owner purporting to extend the lease,
correspondence, tax returns, and ledger books established that the
lease had been renewed for two additional five-year terms.46 Near the
end of the second renewal term, when Rubish failed to give written
notice of his intention to renew for a third term within the ninety-day
period prescribed by the lease, the trustee informed Rubish that the
lease had terminated, ceased accepting rental payments, and brought
an action for summary ejectment and damages.47
After being instructed that "[w]aiver is the intentional surrender
of a known right or privilege," and that "intention may be expressed
or implied from acts or conduct naturally and justly leading the other
party to believe that a right has been intentionally foregone, 48 the
jury found that the trustee had waived the requirement of written
notice in the lease. Judgment was entered in Rubish's favor.4 9 On
appeal Justice Exum, writing for a unanimous court, stated: "[t]he
primary questions for decision are whether there is evidence to
support defendant's assertion of waiver or estoppel, or both, and
whether the jury was properly instructed on these issues."5 Justice
41. 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749 (1982).
42. Id. at 419, 293 S.E.2d at 751.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 419-20, 293 S.E.2d at 751-52 (quoting the lease).
45. Id. at 420, 293 S.E.2d at 752.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 421, 293 S.E.2d at 752.
48. Id. at 424, 293 S.E.2d at 754.
49. Id. at 423, 293 S.E.2d at 753.
50. Id. at 424, 293 S.E.2d at 754.
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Exum explained:
The giving of notice to extend a lease in accordance with the
terms of the lease is a condition precedent to extension of the
lease. Such notice, however, is for the benefit of the lessor and
may be waived by him. The meaning of "waiver" in this
context is at best elusive. " 'Waiver' has been defined as 'an
intentional relinquishment of a known right.' A person sui juris
may waive practically any right he has unless forbidden by law
or public policy. The term, therefore, covers every conceivable
right-those relating to procedure and remedy as well as those
connected with the substantial subject of contracts. Sometimes
[waivers] partake of the nature of estoppel and sometimes of
contract.... No rule of universal application can be devised to
determine whether a waiver does or does not need a
consideration to support it. It is plain, then, that in the nature
and occasion of the particular waiver must lie the answer as to
whether or not it requires such consideration."51
Justice Exum did not independently create a new definition of
"waiver"; his articulation is an accurate restatement of some of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's earlier formulations.52 Justice
Exum's statement, however, highlights essential differences between
the more nuanced use of "waiver" in the North Carolina case law and
the narrowly limited definition proposed by Professor Snyder. Under
Professor Snyder's definition, waivers never require consideration,
and nothing that does require consideration ever constitutes a waiver
per se.
Is waiver a unilateral act that never requires consideration, as
Professor Snyder says, or is it an act the "nature and occasion"53 of
which may require consideration in order to be valid as a waiver, as
Rubish suggests? The two definitions are obviously distinguishable.
There is little hope that Professor Snyder's straightforward definition
will ever be employed by the North Carolina appellate courts. The
existing case law is too extensive and the magnetism of precedent,
however inconsistent and confusing, is too powerful for the courts to
avoid entangling themselves with the definitional morass of the past
as new cases arise. For the practicing lawyer seeking to make sense of
51. Id. at 425, 293 S.E.2d at 754-55 (citations omitted) (quoting Clement v. Clement,
230 N.C. 636, 639-40, 55 S.E.2d 459, 461 (1949)).
52. Justice Exum's opinion cites Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570,144 S.E.2d 636 (1965),
Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97 (1966), and Clement v. Clement,
230 N.C. 636, 55 S.E.2d 459 (1949).
53. Rubish, 306 N.C. at 425, 293 S.E.2d at 754.
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the North Carolina cases, however, it is worthwhile to know that a
simpler definition exists, that it would be helpful if the courts were to
adhere to it, and that the variations on "waiver" that the North
Carolina courts have introduced over the decades are not a model of
clarity. When analyzing the North Carolina cases, an essential
question to ask is whether the waiver is directed at the future or the
past. In other words, does the waiver apply to a condition that has
already failed or to a condition that has not yet matured into a duty of
performance?
B. Modification
In contrast to "waiver," Professor Snyder's definition of
"modification" is somewhat more consistent with the prevailing way
the term has been employed by the North Carolina appellate courts.
A modification is an agreement to change an existing contract.
Modification requires bilateral action, i.e., an agreement of the
parties; this is the central distinction between modification and
waiver. Modifications are themselves contracts, requiring
consideration54 and having the full permanent and binding effect of an
original agreement. Modifications are, however, commonly thought
to carry something forward from the original contract on which they
are based."
54. The exceptions are cases in which a modification does not require consideration to
be binding. For example, agreements modifying contracts within Article 2 of the UCC
"need[] no consideration to be binding." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-209 (2001).
55. Whether the term "modification" is used in the North Carolina appellate case law,
as opposed to the terms "novation" or "rescission," is more a matter of which word the
court prefers in deciding what legal significance will be given to a particular set of factual
circumstances, rather than which word best expresses the analytical grounds of the
decision. A modification is an agreement to change some aspect of an existing contract
without substituting an entirely new contract in its place. A novation is a new agreement
that replaces an existing agreement, either by substitution of one set of obligations for
another, see Lipschutz v. Weatherly, 140 N.C. 365, 369, 53 S.E. 132, 133 (1906), or by
substitution of parties, see Hamilton v. Benton, 180 N.C. 79, 83-84, 104 S.E. 78, 81 (1920).
A rescission (sometimes referred to by its synonyms "cancellation" or "abandonment") is
a contract to end a contract-that is, an agreement between parties to an existing contract
that the existing contract shall no longer bind either of them. See, e.g., Brannock v.
Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 74, 155 S.E.2d 532, 541 (1967) (stating that "[a] rescission implies
the entire abrogation of the contract and a restoration of the benefits received from the
other party") (citations omitted); S. Pub. Util. Co. v. Town of Bessemer City, 173 N.C.
482, 485, 92 S.E. 331, 333 (1917) (recognizing that a written agreement may be orally
"abandoned" by the parties); Faust v. Rohr, 167 N.C. 360, 361, 83 S.E. 622, 622 (1914)
(same); Redding v. Vogt, 140 N.C. 562, 567, 53 S.E. 337, 338 (1906) (same). Because a
rescission is itself a contract, it requires consideration to be enforceable. See, e.g.,
Lipschutz, 140 N.C. at 369, 53 S.E. at 133 (explaining that contract rescission is void if it is
without consideration); Brown v. Catawba Lumber Co., 117 N.C. 287, 297, 23 S.E. 253, 256
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Under the common law, modifications require consideration to
be enforceable. 6  This is the general rule in North Carolina,"
although there are statutory exceptions for contracts involving the
sale58 or lease of goods59 and for premarital agreements,' as well as
the common law exception where promissory estoppel is used as a
substitute for consideration to defend against an action to enforce an
original contract, later amended.6  Without consideration the
modification will not be effective, the contract cannot be enforced as
modified, and the parties are simply left in the same positions as
(1895) (noting that only a "promise either under seal or supported by consideration" can
rescind a contract).
In a sense, a modification always works as both a rescission and a novation
because a new contract is substituted in place of the original. This is so despite the fact
that much of the original contract may be carried forward into the modified contract.
Even where there is considerable similarity between the old agreement and the new, the
modified agreement is nevertheless a different agreement, however familiar its terms may
be. Thus, it could be argued that no modification ever occurs without a rescission and a
novation. Use of the terms (particularly "novation") tends to be confined to particular
factual contexts, with the North Carolina courts relying more on precedent than analysis in
reaching a decision. For a general discussion of rescission and novation with citation to
representative North Carolina cases, see HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 3-26, at
229-31. Cf Snyder, supra note 3, at 627 (noting that the distinction between modification
and rescission "does not work on either a theoretical or a practical level," and using the
term "modification" broadly to encompass "an agreed change to a contract, regardless of
whether the contract is abandoned, rescinded, discharged in whole or in part, or
terminated").
56. See generally HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 3-26, at 225-29 (discussing
"Modification and Waiver").
57. See, e.g., Brenner v. Little Red Sch. House, Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 215-16, 274 S.E.2d
206, 212 (1981) (ordering new trial on issue of fact as to whether contract was properly
modified); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 637, 263 S.E.2d 763, 766 (1980) (outlining
four exceptions in which consideration is not needed for a party to waive the breach of a
contractual provision); Lenoir Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Stancil, 263 N.C. 630, 634, 139 S.E.2d
901, 903 (1965) (holding that a waiver of a substantial right or privilege requires
consideration). North Carolina declines to follow section 89 of the Second Restatement,
which holds that modification of a contract that has not been fully performed (that is, an
executory contract) is binding without consideration if it is "fair and equitable" in view of
changed circumstances that the parties did not anticipate, or if the promisee relied to its
detriment on a promise modifying the promisee's duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 89(a) (1981). It should be noted that under some circumstances the
doctrine of promissory estoppel may be employed in North Carolina as a substitute for
consideration where the promisee uses the contract as modified to defend against an
action by the promisor to enforce the original agreement. For a discussion of the
defensive use of promissory estoppel, see HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 3-43.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-209(1) (2001).
59. Id. § 25-2A-208(1).
60. Id. § 52B-6 to -7. All three exceptions reflect the positions of drafters of uniform
acts (i.e., the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act).
61. See supra note 57.
2003] NO ORAL MODIFICATION CLAUSES 2255
before the attempted modification took place. 62 If consideration is
present, however, the modification can be successfully asserted as a
defense in an action to enforce the original agreement.63
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has added to the
confusion between the terms "waiver" and "modification" by holding
that an executory contract can be modified under a waiver theory
where the waiver is supported by consideration.' The requirement
that a waiver be supported by consideration in order to be valid arises
"where there has been an understanding between the parties that one
or more of the terms of a contract will no longer be binding on the
party claiming waiver. ''6" This statement is itself somewhat
misleading, in that it fails to distinguish between the types of
contractual rights that may not be validly waived without
consideration. Rights that are "formal," even if executory, may be
waived effectively without consideration, while "substantial" rights
can only be waived upon a showing that consideration was given for
the waiver, or that the elements of estoppel were present.66 That is,
an agreement to waive a substantial right or privilege in an existing
contract must be supported by consideration like any other
modification, which is in fact what such an agreement actually is.67
62. See, e.g., Stonestreet v. S. Oil Co., 226 N.C. 261, 263, 37 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1946)
(holding that consideration was lacking from plaintiff to support modification of lease
under which defendant allegedly agreed to reimburse plaintiff for well dug on leased
premises and where plaintiff admitted making no promise in return for defendant's
promise); Wooten v. S.R. Biggs Drug Co., 169 N.C. 64, 68, 85 S.E. 140, 143 (1915) (holding
that no consideration was present to support attempted oral modification of written
agreement in which defendant allegedly gave plaintiff the right to bid on sale of equipment
and thereby earn commissions).
63. See, e.g., Acme Mfg. Co. v. McCormick, 175 N.C. 277, 279, 95 S.E. 555, 556 (1918)
(holding that a defendant's consent to the issuance of an insurance policy on his own life
constitutes consideration and thus can be used as a defense against an action to enforce
the original agreement). Hutson & Miskimon contains abstracts of several cases that
illustrate the requirement of consideration to support a modification of personal services
contracts and contracts for the sale of land. See HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 3-
26, at 227-28 & nn.282-89.
64. See, e.g., Clement v. Clement 230 N.C. 636, 640, 55 S.E.2d 459, 461 (1949)
(ordering new trial on account of error in jury instructions where defendant offered no
evidence of consideration given in exchange for plaintiff's alleged waiver of right to
receive interest payments). Justice Seawell stated: "[n]o rule of universal application can
be devised to determine whether a waiver does or does not need a consideration to
support it." Id.
65. HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 3-26, at 229; see Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417, 427, 293 S.E.2d 749, 755 (1982).
66. Rubish, 306 N.C. at 426, 293 S.E.2d at 755 (citing Lenoir Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v.
Stancil, 263 N.C. 630, 633-34, 139 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1965)).
67. That is, unless an estoppel can be shown. Rubish, 306 N.C. at 426, 293 S.E.2d at
755; Clement, 230 N.C. at 640, 55 S.E.2d at 461.
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An understanding of this kind is first and foremost an agreement, not
a unilateral waiver.68 As such, it is distinguishable from cases where a
contract has been breached and the innocent party elects to waive the
other party's breach; there the waiver is valid even if not supported
by consideration (or an estoppel) because it is, in effect, a waiver of
the other party's nonperformance (along with the waiving party's
remedies for the same) rather than a waiver of an executory portion
of the contract.69
C. Estoppel
The North Carolina appellate decisions generally concur with
Professor Snyder's definition of estoppel. Estoppel is distinguishable
from waiver and modification because it requires reliance. Estoppel
is like modification and unlike waiver in that it is bilateral; both
parties to the contract must do something. Estoppel is unlike
modification, moreover, in that it does not require an agreement and
therefore does not need consideration to be binding.
Far more than modification, estoppel exists in the eye of the
beholder. It is, in essence, a doubtful conclusion drawn by a judge
that justice requires one party to a contract to be prevented from
denying the effect of his own conduct on the other party. What this
really means will be evident to any experienced lawyer: estoppel is
hard to pin down, depending as it does on uncertain requirements
such as "reasonableness" and "foreseeability." Was it reasonable for
the other party to rely? Could the party to be estopped have foreseen
that the other party would rely on his conduct? Unlike modification,
which is nothing more nor less than a new binding contract that can
be analyzed under traditional contract law, "whether a supposed
estoppel will have any effect at all is probably unknowable until a
court gives its opinion."70 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
explained the difference between waiver and estoppel at length in a
1919 opinion:
But upon the question of waiver it may be said that it takes
place where one person dispenses with the performance of
68. Even Justice Sharp was less than completely vigilant in her definition of a
"waiver" as effecting a modification: "Waiver is the intentional surrender of a known
right or privilege, which surrender modifies other existing rights or privileges or varies the
terms of a contract." Lenoir Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Stancil, 263 N.C. 630, 633, 139 S.E.2d
901, 903 (1965) (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Rubish, 306 N.C. at 427,293 S.E.2d at 755 (noting that waiver by estoppel
does not require consideration).
70. Snyder, supra note 3, at 628.
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something which he has a right to exact of another, and it is said
to be a technical principle introduced and applied by the courts
for the purpose of defeating forfeitures. While it belongs to the
family of estoppel and the doctrine of estoppel has a
fundamental relation to it, being the foundation upon which it,
to some extent, rests, they are nevertheless distinguishable
terms, though it may be difficult to draw the distinction
between them which will give to each a clear legal significance
and scope, separate from and independent of the other, as they
are not infrequently used by the courts as convertible
terms .... There are, however, several essential differences
between them, and they may be thus illustrated: Waiver is the
voluntary surrender of a right, while estoppel is the refusal to
permit its assertion because of the mischief that has been done.
Waiver involves both knowledge and intention; one being
essential to the other. An estoppel may arise where there is no
intent to mislead; waiver depends upon what one himself
intends to do; and involves the acts and conduct of only one of
the parties; estoppel involves the conduct of both. A waiver
does not necessarily imply that one has been misled to his
prejudice or into an altered position; an estoppel always
involves this element. Estoppel results from an act which may
operate to the injury of the other party; waiver may affect the
opposite party beneficially. Estoppel may carry the implication
of fraud, and sometimes fraud is clear, but not so in the case of
waiver. The latter is a voluntary act, and exists only where one
with full knowledge of a material fact does or forbears to do
something inconsistent with the existence of the right or of his
intention to rely upon that right. Knowledge of the existence of
the right, benefit or advantage on the part of the party claimed
to have made the waiver is an essential prerequisite to its
relinquishment. No one can be said to have waived that which
he does not know, or where he has acted under a
misapprehension of facts.... The question or waiver is mainly
one of intention, which lies at the foundation of the doctrine.
Waiver must be manifested in some inequivocal manner, and to
operate as such it must in all cases be designed, or one party
must have so acted as to induce the other to believe that he
intended to waiver, when he will be forbidden to assert the
contrary.7
71. Danville Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Gallivan Bldg. Co., 177 N.C. 103, 106-07, 97 S.E.
718, 719-20 (1920) (per curiam). The court later explained:
Though often used interchangeably ... the terms waiver and estoppel are not
synonymous. Waiver ... does not necessarily imply that the one against whom it
is sought to be invoked has misled the other to his prejudice, whereas estoppel
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As discussed above, a modification can be effected under a
waiver theory if the parties enter into an agreement to waive a
condition to be performed in the future. Such an agreement must be
supported either by consideration or by estoppel as a substitute for
consideration.72 Estoppel in this sense is not estoppel in its "true"
form, sometimes known as "equitable" estoppel, for which proof of
actual misrepresentation is required. In order to prove a waiver by
estoppel rather than by consideration, the defendant need not prove
all the elements of an equitable estoppel. Rather, he need only prove
an express or implied promise by one of the parties to waive an
executory provision of the contract and the detrimental reliance on
that promise by the other party.73 Estoppel of this kind is commonly
referred to as "promissory estoppel."
Having compared the definitions of waiver, modification, and
estoppel expounded by the North Carolina appellate courts to
Professor Snyder's definitions, we turn to an examination of the
North Carolina courts' treatment of NOM clauses.
III. NOM CLAUSES AT COMMON LAW FOR AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND ARTICLE 2
Can the parties to a written agreement, by including a NOM or
NOW clause, legislate what is, in effect, a private statute of frauds
that will permit only written modifications, amendments or waivers to
their agreement? The common law rule is that they cannot. Any
written agreement can be modified or rescinded orally, subject only
to the doctrine of consideration and the Statute of Frauds.74 That is,
agreements outside the Statute of Frauds may be modified or
always involves a prejudicial misleading. Sometimes a waiver partakes of the
nature of an estoppel and sometimes of contract.
Stancil, 263 N.C. at 633-34, 139 S.E.2d at 903 (citations omitted).
72. See Rubish, 306 N.C. at 427, 293 S.E.2d at 755; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633,
637,263 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1980).
73. Rubish, 306 N.C. at 427-28, 293 S.E.2d at 756. Similarly, in Colbath v. H.B.
Stebbins Lumber Co., the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated:
[T]o constitute a waiver where there is no consideration, there must be a promise
or permission, express or implied in fact, supported only by action in reliance
thereon, to excuse performance in the future of a condition or of an obligation
not due at the time, when the promise is made, or to give up a defense not yet
arisen, which would otherwise prevent recovery on an obligation.
Colbath v. H.B. Stebbins Lumber Co., 144 A. 1, 5 (Me. 1929). Colbath was cited by the
Rubish court, which expressed the belief that "this distinction [as articulated in Colbath]
will harmonize many decisions and will clarify what appears to be some confusion of
definition and expression." Rubish, 306 N.C. at 427-28, 293 S.E.2d at 756.
74. See Childress v. C.W. Myers Trading Post Inc., 247 N.C. 150, 154, 100 S.E.2d 391,
394 (1957); see also infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text (discussing Childress).
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rescinded by a subsequent oral agreement even though the original
contract was in writing and provided that it could be modified only by
a second written agreement.75 The law will not prevent parties from
entering into another contract regardless of provisions in the original
contract concerning the manner in which they could make later
agreements on the same subject matter.76
The common law places value on the parties' inherent legal
capacity to enter into contracts at any time. Under the common law
rule, it does not matter that the original contract was in writing, or
that the original contract would have to be in writing to be
enforceable. The past cannot control the future. So long as the
amendments, modifications, waivers, or rescission are supported by
consideration or a substitute for consideration77 (and are themselves
outside the Statute of Frauds), they will be considered separate
contracts from the original and will be enforced, even if purely oral.
Thus the paradox: the very principle that makes NOM clauses a
rational protection for parties to adopt (that is, freedom of contract in
the present) is the same principle that makes NOM clauses
unenforceable (that is, freedom of contract in the future). In the
words of the Pennsylvania judge: "The most ironclad written contract
can always be cut into by the acetylene torch of parol modification
supported by adequate proof.... The hand that pens a writing may
not gag the mouths of the assenting parties."78  Or the somewhat
earlier statement of Cardozo when he was chief judge of the Court of
Appeals of New York: "What is excluded by one act is restored by
another. You may put it out by the door; it is back in through the
window. Whenever two men contract, no limitation self-imposed can
destroy their power to contract again.
79
75. One legal encyclopedia states that this is "[tihe rule followed by the courts
generally." 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 527 (1991 & Supp. 2001). This Article discusses
cases from outside North Carolina to the extent that they have influenced decisions by
courts within the state.
76. Id.
77. A common substitute for consideration is the "defensive" use of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel by a promisee claiming that the promisor agreed to modify the
parties' pre-existing contract. For an analysis of the extent to which the North Carolina
appellate courts have adopted promissory estoppel as a viable substitute for consideration,
see HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 3-43, at 261-68. There are also statutory
exceptions that make modifications binding even though not supported by consideration.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-209 (2001) (contracts for the sale of goods); id. § 52B-6
(premarital agreements).
78. Wagner v. Graziano Constr. Co., 136 A.2d 82, 83-84 (Pa. 1957).
79. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 381 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo,
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As Professor Farnsworth suggests, for many years NOM clauses
were a common feature of construction contracts, where they were
used "to protect the owner from claims that his project
superintendent orally modified the contract so as to have the builder
do extra work."80 This use of NOM clauses is well illustrated by
Bartlett v. Stanchfield.81  There, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts considered a purported oral modification to a written
contract for the building of a house which contained a NOM clause.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., explained the rationale for the
common law role of NOM clauses:
Attempts of parties to tie up by contract their freedom of
dealing with each other are futile. The contract is a fact to
be taken into account in interpreting the subsequent conduct
of the plaintiff and defendant, no doubt. But it cannot be
assumed, as a matter of law, that the contract governed all
that was done until it was renounced in so many words,
because the parties had a right to renounce it in any way,
and by any mode of expression they saw fit. They could
substitute a new oral contract by conduct and intimation, as
well as by express words.
82
In the 1929 case of Teer v. George A. Fuller Co.,83 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the common
law rule to a case involving modifications to a contract for
construction of buildings on the campus of Duke University. The
Fourth Circuit relied on Justice Holmes's statement of the policy
underlying the common law's traditional position on the
enforceability of NOM clauses along with other authorities,
"[c]itation of [which] ... could be given almost without number,"84 to
hold that the plaintiff subcontractor was entitled to recover
compensation from the general contractor for additional excavation
work plaintiff had performed at the general contractor's request. The
court concluded that the "original contract ... contemplated that such
[additional] work should be done upon a written order signed by a
properly authorized officer or agent of the defendant [general
contractor], and at prices and terms agreed upon between them."85
While at first blush it may seem odd that the Fourth Circuit did not
apply North Carolina law to the facts in Teer (an appeal from the
80. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.6, at 474 (1982).
81. 19 N.E. 549 (Mass. 1889).
82. Id. at 550.
83. 30 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1929).
84. Id. at 33.
85. Id.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, which had exercised jurisdiction seemingly on the basis of
the parties' diversity of citizenship8 6), it should be remembered that in
1929 the United States Supreme Court had not yet decided Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins.87 Under the pre-Erie rule that in diversity
cases federal courts should fashion federal common law,88 the Fourth
Circuit in effect recognized Justice Holmes's statement as the law to
be applied by federal courts in North Carolina.
Although the court made nothing of the point in its opinion, it is
clear from the facts that Nello Teer performed the additional work in
reliance on a change order made by the defendant's project
superintendent. "[T]he plaintiff in good faith performed the
additional work so agreed upon as designated by defendant's
engineers and other employes [sic] of defendant corporation, and
when said work was completed defendant received and accepted the
same 8.... .9 This fact introduces a recurring theme in the law of oral
modifications: reliance. In most cases, the party who seeks to escape
the effect of a NOM clause has relied on the oral modification or
waiver.9" As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in one
86. The plaintiff, Nello L. Teer, apparently was a North Carolina resident "engaged in
the business of a grading contractor." Id. The defendant was a New Jersey corporation
that had been hired as the general contractor "for the construction of a number of
buildings for Duke University ..... Id. The Fourth Circuit did not cite any North
Carolina decision in reaching its conclusion (although a number of likely candidates were
available), perhaps because the doctrine it applied was almost universally recognized.
Nello L. Teer Company today remains a prominent grading firm in the Research Triangle
area. The building project at issue in the Fourth Circuit cases was probably a portion of
the present West Campus of Duke University, which was under construction in the late
1920s.
87. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
88. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
89. Teer, 30 F.2d at 31.
90. See, e.g., Allen Bros. v. Raleigh Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 180 N.C. 608,611,105 S.E.
401, 402-03 (1920) (holding that where developer incurred increased expenditures in
improving property and owner "personally knew of and consented to" such expenditures,
the owner "abandoned his right to require a written agreement as to such expenditures");
Son-Shine Grading, Inc. v. ADC Constr. Co., 68 N.C. App. 417, 423, 315 S.E.2d 346, 350
(1984) (finding that a grading contractor completed additional excavation work in reliance
on oral modification of contract by the general contractor's on-site supervisor); W.E.
Garrison Grading Co. v. Piracci Constr. Co., Inc., 27 N.C. App. 725, 727-28, 221 S.E.2d
512, 514 (1975) (finding that a contractor completed additional borrow and mucking work
in reliance on the owner's request); J.R. Graham & Son, Inc. v. Randolph County Bd. of
Educ., 25 N.C. App. 163, 166-68, 212 S.E.2d 542, 544-45 (1975) (holding that where
contractor was instructed to perform additional work beyond original specifications and
contractor complied, contractor was entitled to recover for additional work). For further
discussion of Allen Bros. and Son-Shine Grading, see infra notes 99-107, 160-62 and
accompanying text.
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construction case, "when an owner requests a builder to do extra
work, promises to pay for it and watches it performed knowing that it
is not authorized in writing, he cannot refuse to pay on the ground
that there was no written change order."91 The theme of reliance, as
explained below, plays a vital role, if an unacknowledged one, in
North Carolina case law dealing with NOM clauses.
IV. NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON NOM CLAUSES IN
CONTRACTS OUTSIDE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The Fourth Circuit's failure to cite any Supreme Court of North
Carolina decision as authority for the result in Teer was not due to
lack of precedent. 92  Beginning around the turn of the twentieth
century, a flurry of cases dealing with issues of contract waiver,
modification, and estoppel appeared in the pages of the North
Carolina Reports.93 On the whole, this early case law is undisciplined
in recognizing and explaining the analytical distinctions between
these three admittedly confusing contract law concepts.94 The result,
in Professor Snyder's words, is "a swamp of muddy thinking."95
The earliest Supreme Court of North Carolina decisions in the
91. Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 16 (Pa. 1968).
As one commentator has noted, Universal Builders rejected the requirement imposed in a
previous case "that there be a waiver of the no-oral-modification clause prior to and
distinct from the oral modification itself." See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.6, at 493
n.l1; accord Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsico, Inc., 297 A.2d 28, 33 (Del. 1972) ("The
prohibition against amendment except by written change may be waived or modified in
the same way in which any other provision... may be waived or modified, including a
change in the provisions of the written agreement by the course of conduct of the
parties.").
92. Federal courts sitting in North Carolina now apply North Carolina contract law in
diversity cases, unless the law of another state has been selected as the governing law of
the contract at issue. See, e.g., Salem Towne Apts., Inc. v. McDaniel & Sons Roofing Co.,
330 F. Supp. 906, 911-12 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (applying North Carolina law on waiver of
written contracts).
93. See S. Pub. Util. Co. v. Town of Bessemer City, 173 N.C. 482, 92 S.E. 331 (1917);
Makuen v. Elder, 170 N.C. 510, 87 S.E. 334 (1915); Faust v. Rohr, 167 N.C. 360, 83 S.E.
622 (1914); Redding v. Vogt, 140 N.C. 562, 53 S.E. 337 (1906); Lipschutz v. Weatherly, 140
N.C. 365, 53 S.E. 132 (1906).
94. See, e.g., Lipschutz, 140 N.C. at 369-70, 53 S.E. at 134 (citing various authorities
from other jurisdictions for the proposition that subsequent oral agreements made on
sufficient consideration may modify, waive or discharge the original agreement but failing
to distinguish between modification and waiver); Brown v. Catawba River Lumber Co.,
117 N.C. 287, 297, 23 S.E. 253, 256 (1895) (confusing "waiver" of an original contract with
an agreement to modify the same agreement). But see Danville Lumber & Mfg. Co. v.
Gallivan Bldg. Co., 177 N.C. 103, 106-07, 97 S.E. 718, 720 (1919) (per curiam)
(distinguishing carefully between waiver as the intentional act of one of the parties and
estoppel as involving the conduct of both).
95. Snyder, supra note 3, at 625.
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field of contract modification did not involve the specific question of
whether NOM clauses are enforceable, because the contracts
themselves did not contain NOM clauses.96 They focused instead on
whether adequate consideration supported the oral modification or
rescission of a written agreement.97 In these early cases, once a
contract was made, one party's knowing relinquishment of a right
enforceable against the other party and substitution of new
obligations were sufficient without more to make the modification
binding.98
The common ancestor of all North Carolina appellate case law
involving the enforceability of NOM clauses is Justice Brown's
opinion for the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Allen Bros. v.
Raleigh Savings Bank & Trust Co.99 Allen Bros. is the first Supreme
Court of North Carolina decision that dealt with the enforceability of
a NOM clause."° In that case, a contract between a property owner
and a developer limited the amount the developer could spend on
grading streets, laying sidewalks, installing water and sewer lines, and
making similar improvements to $20,000, unless the owner and
developer agreed to additional expenditures.10 1  The contract
provided that "additional development may be made upon mutual
consent in writing."102 The Supreme Court of North Carolina held
that because the owner "personally knew of and consented to...
increased expenditures as being necessary for the proper
development of the property," the owner had "abandoned his right to
96. See, e.g., Redding, 140 N.C. at 569-70, 53 S.E. at 337-38 (considering whether
second of two contracts was intended to replace the first; no evidence of NOM clause);
Lipschutz, 140 N.C. at 369-70, 53 S.E. at 134 (considering whether contract for sale of
goods had been properly rescinded; no evidence of NOM clause); Brown, 117 N.C. at 297,
23 S.E. at 256 (considering whether original contract lacking NOM clause was waived or
rescinded).
97. See, e.g., S. Pub. Util. Co., 173 N.C. at 485-86, 92 S.E. at 333 (noting that it is "well
settled" that ordinarily a written contract before breach may be varied by a subsequent
oral agreement made on sufficient consideration); Lipschutz, 140 N.C. at 370-71, 53 S.E.
at 134 (holding that defendants elected to rescind their written contract in favor of an oral
agreement that was made for valuable consideration).
98. See, e.g., S. Pub. Util. Co. 173 N.C. 482 at 485-86, 92 S.E. at 333 (stating that "the
release of the obligations of the old [contract] and the substitution of new obligations
constitute valuable considerations"); Lipschutz, 140 N.C. at 369, 53 S.E. at 134 (finding
sufficient consideration in the assumption of a new obligation under the contract).
99. 180 N.C. 608, 105 S.E. 401 (1920).
100. The others are Whitehurst & Reaves v. FCX Fruit & Vegetable Serv., Inc., 224 N.C.
628, 32 S.E.2d 34 (1944), and Childress v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 247 N.C. 150, 100
S.E.2d 391 (1957).
101. Allen Bros., 180 N.C. at 609, 105 S.E. at 401.
102. Id. at 610, 105 S.E. at 402.
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require a written agreement as to such expenditures."1 °3 The record
on appeal revealed, however, that the trial court had found as a fact
that the owner and developer "had consented and agreed together"
to eliminate the $20,000 ceiling on expenditures for improvements. 4
The parties' mutual promises, one promise (the owner's waiver of the
$20,000 ceiling requirement) serving as the inducement for the other
(the developer's additional expenditure), were sufficient
consideration to make the modification binding despite the absence
of a written agreement." 5
Although its reasoning is somewhat underdeveloped, Justice
Brown's opinion in Allen Bros. seems to rest on two basic factual
conclusions. First, the parties mutually agreed to eliminate the
$20,000 limit on expenditures, in effect entering into a second
contract supported by consideration. °6 Second, because the owner
knew the additional expenditures were necessary, he was estopped
from insisting on the NOM clause's requirement of a writing
memorializing the increased expenditures. 07
In a second case, Whitehurst & Reaves v. FCX Fruit & Vegetable
Service, Inc.,"°8 the court's discussion of NOM clauses was dictum
because the contract at issue did not contain a NOM clause. A
Wayne County farmer contracted to deliver "the Irish potatoes
produced by [him] for sale during the five year period 1940-1944
inclusive" to FCX, a growers' cooperative." 9 The contract permitted
the farmer to sell his potatoes to other buyers for prices higher than
FCX was prepared to pay, on the condition that he pay the
cooperative "one cent per bag or one and one half cents per barrel"
for all potatoes sold to persons other than those participating in the
cooperative. 110 The contract contained the following NOM clause:
"This instrument contains all of the conditions and terms of the
agreement between the parties hereto and cannot be amended or
changed except by a paper writing signed by both parties."
11'
For two years the farmer sold potatoes to FCX under the
103. Id. at 611, 105 S.E. at 402-03.
104. Id. at 609,105 S.E. at 402.
105. Id. at 610-11, 105 S.E. at 402-03.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 611, 105 S.E. at 403 (stating that "[t]he binding effect of a waiver is founded
on the doctrine of estoppel").
108. 224 N.C. 628, 32 S.E.2d 34 (1944).
109. Id. at 629, 32 S.E.2d at 35.
110. Id.
111. Id. Because Article 2 of the UCC was not in existence at the time of the contract's
execution in 1941, the agreement was not within the Statute of Frauds.
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agreement.112 The farmer and FCX then entered into a second
written contract whereby the farmer agreed to deliver to FCX, on or
before June 20, 1943, "the first 50 cars of U.S. No. 1 Irish Cobbler
Potatoes grown or handled by him during the 1943 marketing
season," for a price no greater than a ceiling amount set by the
United States government.' Shortly after the contract was executed,
inclement weather delayed production of the farmer's potato crop.114
When the farmer explained that he would be unable to deliver the
crop by June 20, FCX responded that "the potato crop was late in
general over the belt," and that "it would be no penalty" for the
farmer to deliver the potatoes late.'
1 5
The farmer shipped eighty-six carloads of potatoes to the
cooperative's consignees under the 1943 agreement, with the last
shipment made on June 26, 1943.116 FCX, denying that it had
consented to waive the time of delivery of potatoes, responded that it
had purchased only three carloads of potatoes under the 1943
agreement and that the remaining eighty-three cars had been
purchased under the earlier contract.117  The farmer sued the
cooperative for the difference between the price he should have been
paid for potatoes under the 1943 agreement and the price FCX
actually paid under the earlier contract. 8
In his opinion for the Supreme Court of North Carolina, Justice
Denny held that evidence of FCX's extension of time for delivery of
the potato crop was properly admitted. 119  Moreover, the court
interpreted the earlier contract as not compelling FCX to accept all
the potatoes tendered by the farmer.120 The court rejected FCX's
argument that evidence of the FCX's acquiescence in the farmer's
delay was inadmissible to modify the 1943 agreement. Justice
Denny summarized the effect of NOM clauses on the common law
rule that written agreements outside the Statute of Frauds can be
modified orally as follows:
112. Id. at 630, 32 S.E.2d at 35.
113. Id. at 630, 32 S.E.2d at 36.
114. Id. at 631, 32 S.E.2d at 36.
115. Id. at 631-32, 32 S.E.2d at 36.
116. Id. at 633, 32 S.E.2d at 37.
117. Id. at 631, 32 S.E.2d at 36.
118. Id. at 633-35, 32 S.E.2d at 37-38.
119. Id. at 636, 32 S.E.2d at 39.
120. Id. at 636-37, 32 S.E.2d at 39. The court noted that the farmer was growing only a
small proportion of the potatoes he tendered to FCX. He and a partner were buying the
remaining potatoes from other growers. Id. at 636, 32 S.E.2d at 39.
121. Id. at 636, 32 S.E.2d at 39.
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The provisions of a written contract may be modified or waived
by a subsequent parol agreement, or by conduct which naturally
and justly leads the other party to believe the provisions of the
contract are modified or waived. This principle has been
sustained even where the instrument provides for any
modification of the contract to be in writing. It has likewise
been sustained where a contract contained a provision to the
effect that "[n]o salesman or agent of the company shall have
the right to change or modify this contract."'22
Although he cited Allen Bros. in stating the rule that NOM
clauses are unenforceable, Justice Denny's attention to the point was
misplaced. The 1943 agreement did not contain a NOM clause, and
that was the agreement the farmer argued had been modified by the
FCX's reassurances about the delivery delay. 23 The Whitehurst &
Reaves court's articulation of the rule on enforceability of NOM
clauses is, therefore, dictum. Justice Denny's point was that a later
parol agreement can always modify or waive the provisions of a
written contract. As in Allen Bros., the court did not clearly commit
to an analysis of the case as involving a "subsequent parol
agreement" that modified the 1943 contract, or a "question of waiver"
of the requirement that potatoes be delivered on the stipulated
date. 124 In light of the court's emphasis on the competing testimony of
whether the FCX manager's reassurances constituted a "waiver" of
the delivery date requirement' 25  as well as the absence of
consideration for a true modification (the delivery date concession
being unilateral), Whitehurst & Reaves is a waiver case or at most an
"estoppel" case to the extent that the FCX manager's comments
induced the farmer to deliver potatoes under the 1943 agreement
despite the delay.'26 Nevertheless, Justice Denny's formulation of the
common law rule that NOM clauses are unenforceable is cited and
quoted in later Supreme Court of North Carolina and North Carolina
Court of Appeals decisions as authority for disregarding NOM
122. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting H.M. Wade Mfg. Co. v.
Lefkowitz, 204 N.C. 449, 451, 453, 168 S.E. 517, 517, 519 (1933)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 631-32, 634, 32 S.E.2d at 36-37, 38 ("Defendants deny any agreement or
consent to waive the time of delivery of potatoes under the 1943 contract and deny that
Whitehurst and Reaves requested an extension of the time.").
126. Justice Denny's opinion says nothing about estoppel. The opinion does, however,
mention that the FCX manager "wanted every potato" that the farmer could sell, and that
the farmer did deliver eighty-six carloads of potatoes to FCX's consignees under authority
of the 1943 contract. Id. at 631-32, 32 S.E.2d at 36.
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clauses. 127
The final Supreme Court of North Carolina decision in descent
from Allen Bros. remains the most frequently cited. l8 In Childress v.
C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc.,1E9 Clyde and Edith Childress entered
into a two-part contract to purchase a lot in the Old Town subdivision
of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and to hire the defendant
corporation to build a house for them on the lot.13°  The contract
contained various building specifications and a requirement that work
on the house be complete by August 21, 1956.131 The contract
contained a NOM clause that stated: "It is agreed that any substantial
variation from the terms of this contract to be binding shall be in
writing [sic] and signed by the parties hereto.' ' 2  When finally
completed nearly two months after the date specified in the
agreement, the constructed house deviated in a number of respects
from the contract specifications. 13   The Childresses instituted an
action for damages to recover for the defendant's breaches.13  The
defendant's answer admitted the respects in which the house deviated
from the contract but averred that the deviations were made at the
request of, or were consented to by, the plaintiffs in each instance. 35
The contract in Childress was a Janus-like instrument. The
portions of the agreement that related to the purchase of the
underlying real property were within the Statute of Frauds and were,
therefore, required to be in writing. 136 The portions relating to the
127. See Childress v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 247 N.C. 150, 154, 100 S.E.2d 391,
394 (1957); Son-Shine Grading, Inc. v. ADC Constr. Co., 68 N.C. App. 417, 422, 315
S.E.2d 346, 348-49 (1984); W.E. Garrison Grading Co. v. Piracci Constr. Co., 27 N.C. App.
725, 729, 221 S.E.2d 512, 515 (1975); J.R. Graham & Son, Inc. v. Randolph County Bd. of
Educ., 25 N.C. App. 163, 167-68, 212 S.E.2d 542, 544-45 (1975).
128. A number of cases decided by the court of appeals cite Childress, omitting
reference to Allen Bros. or Whitehurst. See Camp v. Leonard, 133 N.C. App. 554, 554, 515
S.E.2d 909, 914 (1999); Shields, Inc. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 106 N.C. App. 365, 369-
70, 416 S.E.2d 597, 600 (1992); Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 74 N.C. App. 620,
625-26, 330 S.E.2d 9, 13-14 (1985), affd in part, rev'd in part, 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174
(1986); Biggers v. Evangelist, 71 N.C. App. 35, 45, 321 S.E.2d 524, 531 (1984); W.E.
Garrison Grading Co. v. Piracci Constr. Co., 27 N.C. App. 725, 729, 221 S.E.2d 512, 515
(1975); J.R. Graham & Son, Inc. v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 25 N.C. App. 163, 168,
212 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1975); Fishel & Taylor v. Grifton United Methodist Church, 9 N.C.
App. 224, 227,175 S.E.2d 785, 786 (1970).
129. 247 N.C. 150, 100 S.E.2d 391 (1957).
130. Id. at 151-52, 100 S.E.2d at 392.
131. Id. at 152, 100 S.E.2d at 392.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 152-53, 100 S.E.2d at 392-93.
134. Id. at 152, 100 S.E.2d at 392.
135. Id. at 153, 100 S.E.2d at 393.
136. Id. at 154, 100 S.E.2d at 393.
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construction of the dwelling, e.g., "its size, the materials to be used,
and the time for completion" could be in parol.137 The court's
opinion, written by Justice Rodman, did not determine whether the
plaintiffs' conduct resulted in a waiver or modification of the contract.
Justice Rodman focused instead on the trial judge's instructions to the
jury, which contained several erroneous statements of law.13s After
quoting the same propositions regarding subsequent parol
agreements and NOM clauses that were set forth in Whitehurst &
Reaves, 39 the opinion concluded that if the parties orally assented to
extend the time for completion of the building, the parties would be
bound thereby, notwithstanding the NOM clause. 40
Childress, now nearly fifty years old, is the last decision rendered
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina involving application of a
NOM clause. Since then the state supreme court has not opined on
this issue; instead, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has had the
field to itself,141 deciding a number of cases involving common law
principles of contract modification, waiver, or estoppel.'42 A majority
of these cases involved one of the most familiar factual settings for
137. Id.
138. See id. at 154-55, 100 S.E.2d at 394.
139. See id. at 154, 100 S.E.2d at 394 (containing a substantial portion of the Whitehurst
& Reaves quotation presented, supra, text accompanying note 122).
140. Id. at 156, 100 S.E.2d at 395.
141. The opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina in Salem Towne Apartments, Inc. v. McDaniel & Sons Roofing Co., 330 F. Supp.
906 (E.D.N.C. 1970), appears to be the only decision on the issue by a court with widely
reported decisions since the 1957 decision of the court of appeals. Like most of the court
of appeals cases, Salem Towne Apartments arose in the context of a construction dispute.
The owner of an apartment project brought an action against a roofing contractor and a
shingle manufacturer to recover for discoloration in the shingles that were used to reroof
the project. The owner ordered the contractor to resume work, relying on the shingle
manufacturer's promise that the color would correct itself within 90 days. See id. at 908-
09. The court held that since the roofs were properly installed, the roofing contractor was
paid, and his was work accepted, the owner had waived any rights of action he had against
the contractor and was limited to a warranty claim against the shingle manufacturer. See
id. Thus, the court viewed the owner's actions as falling under the doctrine of waiver. Id.
at 911 ("The doctrine of waiver in proper cases is now as firmly established as the doctrine
of the rigidity and inflexibility of the written word.") (quoting H.M. Wade Mfg. Co. v.
Lefkowitz, 204 N.C. 449, 453, 168 S.E. 517, 519 (1933)).
142. See Camp v. Leonard, 133 N.C. App. 554, 562, 515 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1999); Shields
v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 106 N.C. App. 365, 416 S.E.2d 597 (1992); Pearce v. Am.
Defender Life Ins. Co., 74 N.C. App. 620, 330 S.E.2d 9, 13-14 (1985), affid in part, rev'd in
part, 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986); Biggers v. Evangelist, 71 N.C. App. 35, 321
S.E.2d 524 (1984); W.E. Garrison Grading Co. v. Piracci Constr. Co., 27 N.C. App. 725,
221 S.E.2d 512 (1976); J.R. Graham & Son, Inc. v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 25 N.C.
App. 163, 212 S.E.2d 542 (1975); Fishel & Taylor v. Grifton United Methodist Church, 9
N.C. App. 224, 175 S.E.2d 785 (1970).
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oral modification problems, a dispute over change orders in a
construction project. 143  As such they can be viewed as direct
descendants of Childress and Allen Bros., with Childress sometimes
being cited by them as authority.144 Since the adoption of the UCC in
North Carolina, the court of appeals has also decided several oral
modification cases involving contracts for the sale of goods that are
now governed by section 2-209 UCC. 145 These cases are in a sense
heirs of Whitehurst & Reaves, 46 which if decided today would be an
Article 2 case. 47 More accurately, all of the court of appeals cases are
analytical successors of the cases applying the common law of waiver,
modification, and estoppel decided by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina between 1906 and 1957. A brief examination of these cases
confirms that the court of appeals consistently follows the higher
court's reasoning, as well as its failure to identify clearly the common
law doctrine at play under each set of facts.
Five of the court of appeals cases involved construction projects
in which a change in the scope of a subcontractor's work was
necessary either because of unanticipated site conditions or an
owner's decision, typically communicated by a supervising general
contractor or an architect, to change plans in midstream.48 In the
143. Eight of the cases discussed or cited in this Article involved construction disputes.
See Teer v. George A. Fuller Co., 30 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1999); Salem Towne Apartments, 330
F. Supp. 906 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Childress, 247 N.C. at 150, 100 S.E.2d at 391; Allen Bros. v.
Raleigh Say. Bank & Trust Co., 180 N.C. 608,105 S.E. 401 (1920); Shields, 106 N.C. App.
at 365, 416 S.E.2d at 597; Son-Shine Grading, Inc. v. ADC Constr. Co., 68 N.C. App. 417,
315 S.E.2d 346 (1984); WE. Garrison Grading Co., 27 N.C. App. at 725, 221 S.E.2d at 512;
J.R. Graham & Son, 25 N.C. App. at 163,212 S.E.2d at 542.
144. Childress is cited in Fishel & Taylor and Biggers. See Biggers, 71 N.C. App. at 45,
321 S.E.2d at 531; Fishel & Taylor, 9 N.C. App. at 227, 175 S.E.2d at 786.
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-209 (2001). See Mulberry-Fairplains Water Ass'n v. Town
of N. Wilkesboro, 105 N.C. App. 258, 412, S.E.2d 910 (1992); Varnell v. Henry M.
Milgrom, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 451, 337 S.E.2d 616 (1985); Bone Int'l, Inc. v. Johnson, 74
N.C. App. 703,707, 329 S.E.2d 714, 717 (1985).
146. 224 N.C. 628, 32 S.E.2d 34 (1944). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes
108-23 and accompanying text.
147. Article 2 applies to the sale of "goods," which it defines as "all things ... which
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale." § 25-2-105.
148. The discussion that follows examines three of the cases, J.R. Graham & Son, Inc.
v. Randolph County Board of Education, 25 N.C. App. 163, 212 S.E.2d 542 (1975), WE.
Garrison Grading Co. v. Piracci Construction Co., 27 N.C. App. 725, 221 S.E.2d 512
(1976), and Son-Shine Grading, Inc. v. ADC Construction Co., 68 N.C. App. 417, 315
S.E.2d 346 (1984). The other two cases, although citing Childress as authority for the
proposition that NOM clauses are not enforceable, dealt with the simpler issue of whether
there was evidence of a subsequent oral agreement. See Camp v. Leonard, 133 N.C. App.
554, 562, 515 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1999) (holding that plaintiff homeowner's "actions do not
indicate that he relied upon [construction lender] to monitor construction progress for his
benefit"); Shields v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 106 N.C. App. 365, 369-70, 416 S.E.2d 597,
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first such case, J.R. Graham & Son, Inc. v. Randolph Couty Board of
Education,141 a contract for construction of a high school contained a
NOM clause that required change orders to be in writing. 5 ' The
architect for the project instructed the contractor to perform
additional work beyond the original specifications, and the contractor
complied. 5' Judge Arnold of the court of appeals, affirming the trial
court's conclusion that the contractor was "entitled to recover the
cost of additional work not called for in the contracts," '52 held:
The provisions of a written contract may be modified or waived
by a subsequent parol agreement, or by conduct which naturally
and justly leads the other party to believe the provisions of the
contract are modified or waived. This principle has been
sustained even where the instrument provides for any
modification of the contract to be in writing. 53
The court of appeals reached the same result in W.E. Garrison
Grading Co. v. Piracci Construction Co.'54 and Son-Shine Grading,
Inc. v. ADC Construction Co.'55 These cases, like the early Fourth
Circuit decision in Teer v. George A. Fuller Co.,56 involved plaintiffs
who were subcontractors hired to perform grading and excavation
work on a building site.'57 The written agreements in both cases
contained NOM clauses. In W.E. Garrison Grading Co., the
subcontractor performed "borrow and mucking work" in excess of
the original contract estimates due to the owner's "substantial
600 (1992) (stating that where written agreement between roofing contractor and general
contractor contained NOM clause and roofing contractor notified general contractor of an
additional cost in materials due to the general contactor's adoption of a new set of
construction plans, issue arose as to whether the parties entered into a subsequent oral
agreement changing the gauge of the roofing material).
149. 25 N.C. App. 163, 212 S.E.2d 542 (1975).
150. Id. at 167,212 S.E.2d at 544.
151. Id. at 168, 212 S.E.2d 545.
152. Id. at 167, 212 S.E.2d at 544.
153. Id. at 167-68, 212 S.E.2d at 544-45 (quoting Childress v. C.W. Myers Trading Post,
247 N.C. 150, 154, 100 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1957); Whitehurst & Reaves v. FCX Fruit &
Vegetable Serv., Inc., 224 N.C. 628, 636-37, 32 S.E.2d 34, 39 (1944)); see supra note 122
and accompanying text. The court of appeals had quoted the same passage from Childress
five years earlier in reversing a judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff architects,
who contended that their written contract to design a church sanctuary could not be
modified by a subsequent oral agreement because it contained a NOM clause. See Fishel
& Taylor v. Grifton United Methodist Church, 9 N.C. App. 224, 227, 175 S.E.2d 785, 786
(1970).
154. 27 N.C. App. 725, 221 S.E.2d 512 (1975).
155. 68 N.C. App. 417,315 S.E.2d 346 (1984).
156. 30 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1929). Teer was discussed in Part II above.
157. See Son-Shine Grading, 68 N.C. App. at 417, 315 S.E.2d at 347; W.E. Garrison
Grading Co., 27 N.C. App. at 726-27, 221 S.E.2d at 513.
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deviation from the final site plan" at the request and under the
supervision of the owner's engineer."' The court of appeals, quoting
the language from J.R. Graham & Son and Childress, held that this
conduct was of the type that "naturally and justly leads the other
party to believe the provisions of the contract are modified or
waived," and was therefore enforceable as modified against the
owner.
59
In Son-Shine Grading, the general contractor's field supervisor
orally instructed the grading subcontractor to perform additional
excavation work despite a requirement in the written agreement that
rock requiring removal would first be measured by the general
contractor's engineers."6  The court of appeals, paraphrasing the
language of Childress,' held that the trial court's findings of fact
were "clearly sufficient" to support the conclusion that "the contract
terms governing the measurement of the amount of rock removed
was modified by a mutual oral agreement.'
' 62
Two practical considerations emerge from a careful reading of
W.E. Garrison Grading Co. and Son-Shine Grading. First, the court
of appeals did not explicitly analyze whether the oral modification
that contravened the NOM clause in each case was supported by
consideration. This seems to be the result of the court's attention to
facts that in both cases revealed pronounced elements of estoppel. In
W.E. Garrison Grading Co., the subcontractor performed the
additional borrow and mucking excavation, and the owner paid for a
portion of it.163  After the subcontractor in Son-Shine Grading
performed additional work, the general contractor received and paid
some of the bills-which meant that he had notice of the quantity of
work being performed-and then allowed his engineers to continue
working on other jobs.164 It appears that when substantial issues of
waiver and estoppel are present, the court of appeals has not carefully
analyzed whether consideration was present in deciding whether to
invalidate a NOM clause. Under circumstances where estoppel is
158. W.E. Garrison Grading Co., 27 N.C. App. at 727-29,221 S.E.2d at 513-15.
159. Id. at 729, 221 S.E.2d at 515 (citations omitted) (citing J.R. Graham & Son, Inc. v.
Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 25 N.C. App. 163, 167-68, 212 S.E.2d 542,544-45 (1975)).
160. Son-Shine Grading, 68 N.C. App. at 420,315 S.E.2d at 348-49.
161. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
162. Son-Shine Grading, 68 N.C. App. at 422, 315 S.E.2d at 349.
163. W.E. Garrison Grading Co., 27 N.C. App. at 728, 221 S.E.2d at 514.
164. Son-Shine Grading, 68 N.C. App. at 423, 315 S.E.2d at 350. "In doing so, ADC
ratified the modification made and the appellants are estopped to deny Mabe's authority
to make it. To hold otherwise would be to penalize plaintiff for ADC's own derelictions,
which the law does not permit." Id. at 423, 315 S.E.2d at 350 (citations omitted).
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used as a substitute for consideration, the court sees no need to draw
attention to what it is doing.
Second, the extent of a corporate agent's authority is often an
underlying issue in NOM clause cases. In both W.E. Garrison
Grading Co. and Son-Shine Grading, the apparent or implied
authority of an on-site engineer or supervisor to agree to change
orders was in question.165 As the cases show, the court of appeals has
not hesitated to uphold trial court findings that a supervisor or
professional adviser, on whom a party depended to carry out a
particular project or task, had sufficient authority to agree to
substantial oral modifications on behalf of his principal.'66
The North Carolina appellate decisions that have examined the
enforceability of NOM clauses aptly illustrate the core issue identified
in Part I of this Article. In every case, the parties included a NOM
clause in their original written agreement. In the course of
performance, a party suggested a change by words or conduct, and
the other party relied on those words or that conduct to its own
detriment. The party who suggested the change then attempted to
enforce the original agreement by invoking the NOM clause, usually
in order to avoid having to pay a higher price for additional work or a
different quantity of goods. In addition, the party argued that its
agent who approved the change did not have authority to do so.
Whatever array of facts a particular case may present, there has
usually been evidence of reasonable, good-faith reliance on the
suggesting party's (or its agent's) word, with the result that the court
invokes principles of reliance or estoppel to prevent the injustice that
would occur if the NOM clause were enforced.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Some contracts are governed by the Statute of Frauds. These
contracts are unenforceable unless they are in writing and signed by
the person to be bound by the contract's terms."67 A nonexhaustive
165. See Son-Shine Grading, 68 N.C. App. at 420, 315 S.E.2d at 348; W.E. Garrison
Grading Co., 27 N.C. App. at 729, 221 S.E.2d at 515.
166. Cf. Biggers v. Evangelist, 71 N.C. App. 35, 44-45, 321 S.E.2d 524, 530-31 (1984)
(holding that where written contract for sale of real property contained NOM clause, oral
agreement between parties' lawyers to modify property description in deed was sufficient
to modify description in sale contract); J.R. Graham & Son, Inc. v. Randolph County Bd.
of Educ., 25 N.C. App. 163, 167-68, 212 S.E.2d 542, 544-45 (1975) (finding oral
modification where architect instructed plaintiff to perform work additional to that in the
contract and supervised and approved payment of invoice).
167. For a thorough review of the types of contracts that are within the North Carolina
Statute of Frauds, see HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, §§ 4-18 to 4-70, at 328-416.
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list of contracts governed by the Statute of Frauds in North Carolina
includes the following: (1) contracts involving interests in real
property (including contracts to sell land, certain leases, mortgages,
deeds of trust, easements, restrictive covenants, profits a prendre,
mineral leases and mining contracts, and certain contracts regarding
timber and growing crops);'68 (2) guaranty and suretyship contracts;
169
(3) contracts for the sale of goods for a price of $500 or more 171 or for
the lease of goods; 171 (4) certain contracts by executors and
administrators of decedents' estates;172 (5) contracts that make
unenforceable any oral promise to pay a debt where the effect of the
promise is to fix a new date from which the statute of limitations
runs;173 (6) covenants not to compete made as part of an employment
contract or an agreement for the sale of a business;174 (7) certain
contracts between a husband and wife releasing rights in real estate
and future income; 175 (8) separation agreements;176 (9) contracts made
by or on behalf of a city;177 and (10) commercial loan commitments in
excess of $50,000.171
An article on NOM and NOW clauses is not the place to discuss
interpretive problems incident to the Statute of Frauds and whether
the statute applies after the original contract is concluded. Such
issues are better left to scholarly commentary on the Statute of
Frauds itself. Because the applicability of the "public" Statute of
Frauds to certain types of contracts inevitably duplicates the effects of
a "private" statute of frauds in the form of NOM and NOW clauses, it
is important for North Carolina lawyers to understand that contracts
within the Statute of Frauds will receive the same practical benefits as
if a NOM or NOW clause had been included in the writing
memorializing the parties' original agreement.
The traditional rule embraced by a majority of American courts
is that in order to be enforceable, modifications of contracts within
the Statute of Frauds must comply again with the requirements of the
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (2001).
169. Id. § 22-1.
170. Id. § 25-2-201(1).
171. Id. § 25-2A-201(l)(b).
172. Id. § 22-1.
173. Id. § 1-26.
174. Id. § 75-4.
175. Id. § 52-10(a).
176. Id. § 52-10.1.
177. Id. § 160A-16.
178. Id. § 22-5.
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Statute with a signed writing. 179 This is also the rule in North
Carolina: even if a writing memorializing the original agreement is
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the party seeking to enforce
the contract as modified will have no contract remedy if the writing
does not embody the alleged modification. 8 '
The Supreme Court of North Carolina occasionally has
recognized exceptions to the common law rule based on theories of
estoppel or waiver. For example, in Johnson v. Noles 8' the plaintiff,
Johnson, had a written option to purchase the defendants' land. At
the closing, Johnson's lawyer informed the defendants that his title
investigation had disclosed certain defects in the title.'82 The lawyer
suggested the closing be delayed for several days to give him time to
clear the title.'83 The evidence at trial tended to show that the
defendants orally agreed to the extension in order to provide a deed
with full covenants and warranties of title." When Johnson's lawyer
tendered the full purchase price at the rescheduled closing less than
one week later, the defendants refused to sign the deed on the ground
that the agreement to an extension was a parol modification to the
original option contract and did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds.'85
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, speaking through Justice
Denny, held that the defendants were estopped from refusing to
perform the agreement as modified because they had induced
Johnson to delay the closing in order to enable them to deliver clean
179. See, e.g., Van den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir.
1978) (holding that a buyer's return of a warranty postcard was insufficient to operate as
an enforceable modification of the warranty); Green Constr. Co. v. First Indem. of Am.
Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that a purported oral modification
was ineffective for failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds); Cooley v. Big Horn
Harvestore Sys., Inc., 767 P.2d 740, 744 (Colo. App. 1988) (holding that a warranty
modification must comply with the Statute of Frauds), affd in part, rev'd in part, 813 P.2d
736 (Colo. 1991).
180. See, e.g., Carr v. Good Shepherd Home, Inc., 269 N.C. 241, 243-44, 152 S.E.2d 85,
88 (1967) (holding that modification was unenforceable because the writing upon which
plaintiff, a purchaser of land, relied contained only the terms of the original agreement
and did not embody the terms of the alleged modification); Concrete Mach. Co. v. City of
Hickory, 134 N.C. App. 91, 95, 517 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1999) (holding that the purported oral
agreement to relocate a sewer easement was unenforceable for failure to comply with the
Statute of Frauds). See generally HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 4.4, at 283-84
(citing both of these cases and providing a comprehensive discussion of the traditional
rule).
181. 224 N.C. 542, 31 S.E.2d 637 (1944).
182. Id. at 543, 31 S.E.2d at 638.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 543-44, 31 S.E.2d at 638.
185. Id.
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title to the land.186 In other cases, the state supreme court avoided
injustice by construing a subsequent oral undertaking as a waiver of a
term in the original agreement, thus bypassing the requirement that a
modification of the original written agreement satisfy the Statute of
Frauds.
18 7
The effect of the Statute of Frauds on contracts that are
subsequently orally modified is aptly illustrated by the decision of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Varnell v. Henry M. Milgrom,
Inc.,88 a case decided under Article 2 of the UCC. Varnell, a peanut
farmer, executed a written contract with peanut buyer Henry M.
Milgrom, Inc. under which Milgrom agreed to purchase all of
Varnell's peanut crop grown under a federal crop quota program.'89
The agreed price for the peanuts was $640 per ton. 9° According to
Varnell, Milgrom later agreed to purchase, in addition to Varnell's
quota program peanuts, all other peanuts grown by Varnell.' 91 As
part of the new arrangement, Milgrom would pay a reduced price of
$600 per ton for all of Varnell's peanuts. 19 2 The new arrangement was
186. Id. at 546, 31 S.E.2d at 640. Justice Denny stated:
The proposition that one party to a contract should thus discharge himself from
his own obligations by inducing the other party to give him time for their
performance is, to say the least, very startling, and, if well founded, will enable
the defendants in this case to make use of the Statute of Frauds, not to prevent a
fraud upon themselves, but to commit a fraud upon the plaintiff.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Alston v. Connell, 140 N.C. 362, 368-69, 53 S.E. 292, 295
(1906) (holding that where plaintiff consented to delay in the closing of a purchase option
at defendant's request, defendant could not later avoid the agreement on the basis that
parol modification was not placed in writing).
187. See Fletcher v. Jones, 314 N.C. 389, 394, 333 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1985). In Fletcher,
the state supreme court, speaking through Justice Frye, held that the plaintiff, a purchaser
of land, was entitled to specific performance where the defendant-seller, after the original
deadline for closing stipulated in the written contract had expired, repeatedly assured the
plaintiff that closing would occur as soon as his divorce became final. "By characterizing
the defendant's oral promise of an extension of time as a waiver, the supreme court
avoided ruling on whether such an extension needed to be in writing." HUTSON &
MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 4.4, at 285 n.17 (citing Fletcher, 314 N.C. at 389, 333 S.E.2d at
731); cf. Fletcher v. Jones, 69 N.C. App. 431, 438, 317 S.E.2d 411, 416 (1984) (Becton, J.,
dissenting), affd in part, rev'd in part, 314 N.C. 389, 333 S.E.2d 731 (1985) (stating that the
better analysis was to estop the defendant from raising the Statute of Frauds so as to
prevent him from defrauding the plaintiff). The court of appeals and supreme court
opinions in the Fletcher litigation are good examples of the relative interchangeability of
the waiver and estoppel doctrines in North Carolina and the analytical lengths to which
the appellate courts will go to avoid unfairness.
188. 78 N.C. App. 451, 337 S.E.2d 616 (1985). Varnell is discussed in HUTSON &
MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 8-4, at 528.
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not reduced to writing)93 Milgrom later refused to take delivery of
any peanuts.1 94 Varnell was forced to sell his peanuts elsewhere at
prices substantially below $600 per ton.'
Because Varnell's agreement with Milgrom was a contract for
the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more, it was subject to the
Statute of Frauds. 196 The main issue before the court of appeals was
whether the alleged agreement changing the price term of the original
contract from $640 to $600 per ton was a novation or a new
agreement as required to resatisfy the Statute of Frauds, or instead,
an attempt at modification of the original agreement that operated as
a waiver. 97 Section 2-209(4) of the UCC provides: "Although an
attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the
requirements of [the Statute of Frauds] ... it can operate as a
waiver."198
Varnell argued that the alleged oral agreement was not a
novation but a modification, and as such "operate[d] as a waiver" of
Milgrom's ability to assert the Statute of Frauds.'99 The court of
appeals rejected this reasoning, relying on the language of section 2-
209(5)200 to hold that "waiver" in section 2-209(4) "is employed with
reference to the terms of the contract, not the Statute of Frauds.
2°1
The official comment to section 2-209(4) states that the intent of the
section is "to prevent contractual provisions excluding modification
except by a signed writing from limiting ... the legal effect of the
parties' actual later conduct. '2°2 Subsection (4) "is directed primarily
toward conduct after formation of the contract which will constitute a
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. After Varnell commenced a legal action to recover for the lost sale, Milgrom
tendered payment for the quota peanuts.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (2001).
197. Varnell, 78 N.C. App. at 454, 337 S.E.2d at 618 (stating that "the record does not
reveal whether the parties intended at the time of the alleged agreement to substitute a
new contract for the original one or simply to modify it").
198. § 25-2-209(4) (2001).
199. Varnell, 78 N.C. App. at 454, 337 S.E.2d at 618.
200. § 25-2-209(5). The statute states:
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the contract
may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other party that
strict performance will be required of any term waived, unless the retraction
would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the
waiver.
Id.
201. Varnell, 78 N.C. App. at 455, 337 S.E.2d at 619.
202. § 25-2-209 N.C. cmt. (2001).
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waiver .... ",203 Varnell's pleadings alleged no conduct of either party
consistent with the alleged oral agreement.2°4 Judge Eagles was
careful to point out that Varnell "did not plant additional peanuts in
reliance on the alleged oral agreement, nor did he allege any other
conduct tending to show reliance.
2°5
Although the published opinion does not reveal whether
Varnell's contract with Milgrom contained a NOM clause, the
presence of a NOM clause would not have altered the court's
decision. Section 2-209(2) is the only provision of the General
Statutes of North Carolina that specifically validates NOM clauses:
"A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded,
but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form
supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other
party. 20 6 Had Varnell's and Milgrom's oral attempt to change the
contract price resulted in post-formation conduct consistent with a
waiver of the NOM clause, the waiver might have been effective
pursuant to section 2-209(3).2o7 Subsections (2) and (3) are at bottom
duplicative: one affects private statutes of frauds erected by the
parties in the form of NOM clauses, and the other affects the public
Statute of Frauds as embodied in the General Statutes of North
Carolina.2 °8 In essence the legislature, by enacting the Statute of
Frauds contained in section 2-201 of the UCC, imposed a NOM
clause on the Varnell-Milgrom contract. The court of appeals simply
enforced it by refusing to apply the statutorily mandated waiver
exception to the facts of the case.20 9
203. Id.
204. See Varnell, 78 N.C. App. at 456,337 S.E.2d at 619.
205. Id.
206. § 25-2-209(2).
207. See id. § 25-2-209(3).
208. It could be argued that Article 2's private statute of frauds is more powerful than
the public Statute of Frauds because it can bar enforcement in situations where an
exception to the Statute of Frauds would prevail.
209. Cf. Mulberry-Fairplains Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of N. Wilkesboro, 105 N.C.
App. 258, 267-68, 412 S.E.2d 910, 916-17 (1992) (holding that where defendant failed to
plead the Statute of Frauds as a defense to the alleged oral modification of a contract for
the sale of water, his or her right to assert the Statute of Frauds had been waived, and
alleged modification would be enforced under doctrine of equitable estoppel); Bone Int'l,
Inc. v. Johnson, 74 N.C. App. 703, 706-07, 329 S.E.2d 714, 716-17 (1985) (holding that
where the buyer's evidence showed that the buyer had relied to his detriment on the
seller's oral waiver of warranty disclaimers in written sales agreement, summary judgment
in favor of the seller of used trucks was improper even though there was no writing
evidencing oral modification to the sales agreement). Bone Int'l and Mulberry-Fairplains
are discussed in HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 8-4, at 528 (Bone Int'l) and 531-
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VI. CERTAIN PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS
At this point it should not be difficult to deduce that where NOM
and NOW clauses are concerned, there are four basic types of
contracts: (1) agreements governed by North Carolina law that are
within the North Carolina Statute of Frauds, including agreements
governed by Article 2 of the UCC; (2) agreements governed by North
Carolina law that are outside the North Carolina Statute of Frauds;
(3) agreements governed by the law of another state that are within
the Statute of Frauds as adopted by that state's legislature;21° and (4)
agreements governed by the law of another state that are outside that
state's Statute of Frauds. The purpose of this Part VI is to reflect on
the settings in which NOM and NOW clauses are usually drafted, and
then to consider some practical ramifications of each contract type.
Most well-drafted contracts contain some sort of NOM clause.
Why this should be the case is unclear. The answer may lie in ready
access to a law firm's forms file and the indiscriminate use of cutting
and pasting within documents that are easily retrieved from a
computer database containing thousands of contracts. Agreements
that do not need NOM clauses because they are already within the
Statute of Frauds include the clauses out of an abundance of caution.
But lawyers drafting agreements for which NOM clauses are useless
because they are outside the Statute of Frauds nevertheless insist on
inserting the clauses, either from ignorance or hope that the court
might enforce the clause in derogation of the common law.
There appears to be no reason to insert a NOM clause in
contracts that are within the North Carolina Statute of Frauds.
Because modifications of contracts within the Statute of Frauds must
resatisfy the requirements of the Statute with a signed writing,1 the
Statute inevitably duplicates the effect of the NOM clause.2 2
Moreover, there seems to be little reason to insert a NOM clause in a
32 (Mulberry-Fairplains).
210. Practitioners should exercise caution in determining whether an agreement
governed by the law of a different jurisdiction is within the Statute of Frauds. Other
states, like North Carolina, may codify their Statutes of Frauds in scattered sections of
their compiled statutes.
211. See § 25-2-209(3); Carr v. Good Shepherd Home, Inc., 269 N.C. 241, 243-44, 152
S.E.2d 85, 88 (1967); HUTSON & MISKIMON, supra note 32, § 4.4, at 283-84. There is a
narrow category of sales contracts (those in which the price of the goods is less than $500)
for which section 2-209(2) of the UCC validates the enforceability of NOM clauses. See
§ 25-2-209(2). Written agreements for sales contracts of this size are rarely seen. For
other sales contracts, section 2-209(3) controls.
212. There is of course no harm, other than prolixity, in including a NOM clause in
contracts that are within the Statute of Frauds.
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contract that is outside the North Carolina Statute of Frauds, at least
as the law now stands. A party that seeks to enforce a NOM clause in
a contract outside the Statute will be disappointed, because the
common law will hold the clause to be unenforceable. For these
reasons, North Carolina lawyers would be well advised to consider
whether there is any point in including NOM clauses in the contracts
they draft.
As the law now stands, NOM clauses are unnecessary in
contracts that are governed by North Carolina law. If, on the other
hand, the North Carolina General Assembly were to adopt a statute
enforcing NOM clauses as recommended in Part VII below, and if
that statute were to apply retroactively (either by express legislation
or judicial interpretation) to contracts existing at the time of its
enactment, inclusion of a NOM clause could be helpful to clients. If
for that reason only, there is no harm, and perhaps some residual
benefit, in continuing to include NOM clauses in contracts governed
by North Carolina law.
For contracts governed by the laws of states other than North
Carolina, the lawyer should ascertain whether the governing state law
contains a statute enforcing NOM clauses. New York law is often
selected to govern in complex commercial transactions, and that state
has adopted such a statute.213 If the contract in question is governed
by the law of such a state, the lawyer should include a NOM clause if
it is in the best interest of the client.
From the brief review in Part V above of the types of contracts
that fall within the North Carolina Statute of Frauds, it is clear that
the Statute of Frauds is a meaningful enforcement mechanism for
NOM clauses in a limited class of cases.214 North Carolina lawyers
carrying on general business practices, however, are likely to handle a
great variety of contracts for which the subject matter is not within
the Statute of Frauds. For example, the complex contractual edifices
in which corporate acquisitions and business combinations take
place-mergers, sales of stock, sales of assets or divisional businesses,
share exchanges and the like-are typically outside the Statute of
Frauds. The documents that memorialize fundamental corporate
transactions of these type3 often entail execution and performance of
a host of related documents: stock purchase, asset purchase, or
merger agreements containing executory covenants (for example, so-
213. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-301(1) (McKinney 2001).
214. The "public" Statute of Frauds eliminates the need for parties to legislate
"private" statutes of frauds. See supra Part V.
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called "earn-out" provisions); escrow agreements under which
portions of the purchase price are retained pending the occurrence of
certain events; employment agreements for target company
management;215 promissory notes for portions of the purchase price
and agreements pledging collateral to secure performance of those
notes; and a miscellany of other agreements reflecting contractual
undertakings ancillary but nonetheless essential to the main
transaction.
When counsel and clients meet at the closing table to execute
and deliver the array of paper over which they have labored so
diligently, the last thing on their minds is the possibility that the
agreements could be modified by a subsequent oral agreement. Yet
lawyers who would recoil at the thought of advising a client to
execute a stock purchase agreement without a NOM clause are often
unaware of the clause's inefficacy in the face of a subsequent oral
modification, supported by consideration, which can be proved by
clear and convincing parol evidence.216 Because the oral modification
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, the party claiming
modification may be unable to survive the other party's motion for
summary judgment. Once a summary judgment motion is made, the
modification claimant will need to present, in opposing affidavits and
other papers, clear and convincing evidence of mutual assent and
consideration for the modification.1 7
On the less glamorous side of transactional practice, the problem
215. By contrast, noncompetition agreements for owners of the target company who
are "cashing out" are subject to the Statute of Frauds in North Carolina. See § 75-4.
216. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Jordan, 5 N.C. App. 249, 253, 168 S.E.2d 229,
232 (1969) (stating that "[e]vidence of an oral agreement which modifies a written contract
should be clear and convincing"). The enforceability of NOM clauses is counterbalanced
by other principles of contract law that can protect a party from false claims of contract
modification. These other principles are: (1) the requirement of mutual assent as to the
material terms of the modification; (2) the requirement of consideration for modifications
at common law (that is, evidence of a bargained-for exchange); and (3) the requirement
that mutual assent and consideration be proved with clear and convincing evidence.
217. The rule in both state and federal courts is that when ruling on a motion for
summary judgment in general, the trial court must apply the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986);
Proffitt v. Greensboro News & Record, Inc., 91 N.C. App. 218, 298, 371 S.E.2d 292, 297
(1998); Varner v. Bryan, 113 N.C. App. 697, 704-07, 404 S.E.2d 295, 299-301 (1994). The
parties' inability to cut off a modification claim as early as possible, i.e., at the pleading
stage with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than at summary judgment, may
mean that summary judgment is the first stage at which an oral modification claim can be
defeated. This ensures that a disputed oral modification will entail all the expenses of
litigation, i.e., expenses associated with depositions, discovery, motions, etc., other than
the expenses associated with a trial itself.
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may be worse. Entering into stand-alone agreements is the stuff of
life for many businesses. Lawyers review, negotiate, and draft
contracts of seemingly endless variety for business clients every day.
To list only a few examples, such contracts include services
agreements, employment or consulting agreements, confidentiality
agreements preparatory to cooperative business activity, joint
research or product development agreements, and technology
licensing agreements. These self-contained agreements may carry
financial stakes ranging from a few thousand dollars to millions in
potential revenues or expenditures. Clients would no more consider
entering into a significant stand-alone contract on a purely oral basis
than they would a merger agreement. Parties to a heavily negotiated
contract may spend days or months hammering out language that
accurately reflects the business terms. At the same time, their
lawyers are focused on representations, warranties, affirmative and
negative covenants, indemnification provisions, and other
"substantive" clauses of the agreement. Many of these complex
agreements would be enforceable in .the absence of a writing so long
as their basic terms could be proved by oral testimony.
Whether the contract is within or outside the Statute of Frauds, a
careful drafter should consider whether the client is likely to assert an
oral modification and whether the client is likely to abide by the
requirement of obtaining a written modification if the contract
actually is changed in the future. Is the client a service provider or
contractor who is the likely recipient of an oral change order and may
have to decide whether the order can be honored? 18 Or is the client
a purchaser of services or a property owner who is more likely to be
the source of a change order? If the client is the former, a NOM
clause may not be in the client's interests; if the client is the latter,
inserting a NOM clause may be advisable if the state law governing
the contract includes a statute enforcing NOM clauses.
218. NOM clauses may not always be in the client's interest. For example, in services
contracts the service provider often has multiple duties, while the customer's primary
obligation is simply to pay the purchase price. In this situation a NOM clause could work
against the service provider's interest if the customer changes the type of services he
wishes to receive after performance has begun but fails to execute a confirmatory writing.
The NOM clause might prevent the service provider from recovering for the
undocumented services. Under the statute recommended in Part VII, however,
reasonable, good-faith reliance on the service provider's part could allow for recovery in
the interest of justice.
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VII. A LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION
The common law rule on the unenforceability of NOM clauses
for contracts outside the Statute of Frauds has been the subject of
important statutory inroads. Both New York and California have
adopted statutes that purport to enforce provisions in written
agreements that prohibit oral modification or rescission.219  As has
been noted elsewhere in this Article, North Carolina itself has
validated NOM clauses that appear in certain limited classes of
agreements, largely as the result of the General Assembly's adoption
of uniform acts in particular fields of law.22° These statutes are, at a
superficial level, nothing more than legislative extensions of the
Statute of Frauds; they carry out the parties' intentions as
memorialized in their original agreement.
Changing the common law principle that NOM and NOW
clauses are unenforceable is no simple matter. While contract law
does not easily accommodate changes, it is difficult to modify the law
itself without the aid of appellate judges.221 In states that have
adopted statutes reversing the common law rule that NOM and NOW
clauses are unenforceable, the legislature's efforts have met with
"surprisingly sharp resistance from the bench, 222  as judges
confronted with complicated facts have sought to achieve equitable
results. The judiciary's main objection to a complete statutory
reversal of the common law rule is the injustice worked by the
reversal where one party has relied on the oral modification. Courts
in states where NOM clauses have received legislative blessing have
bent over backwards to avoid this harsh result by bringing to bear
several creative mechanisms from the judicial toolbox: they have
generously found that a writing in fact existed;223 have held that the
219. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1698 (1985) (stating that a contract in writing may be
altered by a contract in writing or by an executed oral agreement); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 15-301(1) (McKinney 2001) (stating that a written agreement that contains a
provision forbidding oral change cannot be changed by an executory agreement unless
such agreement is in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought
or by his agent).
220. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-209(2) (2001) (contracts for the sale of goods);
id. § 25-2A-208(2) (leases of goods); id. § 52B-6 (premarital agreements).
221. Snyder, supra note 3, at 640.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., DFI Communications v. Greenberg, 363 N.E.2d 312, 316 (N.Y. 1977)
(stating that the minutes of a board of directors' meeting signed by the corporate secretary
were enough to constitute a writing under a New York statute enforcing NOM clauses);
Monroc, Inc. v. Jack B. Parson Constr. Co., 604 P.2d 901, 906 (Utah 1979) (holding in the
alternative that the buyer's letter was a sufficient writing under Article 2 of the UCC even
though it was written to a state engineer rather than to the seller).
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original written agreement was rescinded and replaced by a new oral
one;224 or have used estoppel to defeat the NOM clause where
substantial reliance was at stake. 225  As long as judges remain
determined to minimize unjust outcomes, it will be difficult for
legislatures to enact validating statutes, however artfully contrived,
that will confine the judiciary in a cage. 226  Drafters of legislation
would do well to bear in mind that "[j]udges are the ones faced most
immediately with real, particularized fact situations, and
understandably the courts seek an equitable result. '227  There are
limits on the efficacy of statutory innovation.
Nevertheless, there should be a way for the law to show greater
respect for the parties' role in making their own rules through the use
of NOM and NOW clauses. We need, in Professor Snyder's words, a
way to resolve "the conundrum of accommodating change while
protecting the legal knot tied in the original deal," so that contracting
parties can "have a hand in making the rules by which they plan to
play. '228 Legislation must fashion a rule that offers both predictability
for contracting parties and flexibility for judges who interpret their
contracts.
A lawyer's first reaction to the need for responsive legislation is
to look to the most comprehensive and successful commercial statute
ever adopted by the states: the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 2
of the UCC provides that "[a] signed agreement which excludes
modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be
otherwise modified or rescinded," but "an attempt at modification or
rescission [that] does not satisfy ... [such a] requirement[ ] ... can
operate as a waiver. ' 229  At least superficially, the UCC seems to
accomplish everything that is needed. NOM clauses are valid, and
the parties' efforts at subsequent modifications that do not honor the
NOM clause are ineffective as a contractual change. Harsh results
can be avoided in individual cases by construing the modification as a
224. See Green v. Doniger, 90 N.E.2d 56, 59 (N.Y. 1949) (holding that the intent of the
parties was to allow subsequent oral modifications to replace the original written
contract).
225. See Rose v. Spa Realty Assocs., 366 N.E.2d 1279, 1284 (N.Y. 1977) (finding
induced reliance significant enough to warrant estoppel). Professor Snyder carefully
analyzes the treatment of the New York statute by that state's highest court. See Snyder,
supra note 3, at 640-45.
226. The metaphor is Professor Snyder's. See Snyder, supra note 3, at 642.
227. Id. at 644.
228. Id. at 610-11.
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-2-209(2), (4) (2001). The waiver may be retracted, but
only if it relates to an executory part of the contract and if the other party has not relied
on the waiver. Id. § 25-2-209(5).
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waiver.
The difficulty with using Article 2 as a model for a statute that
would validate NOM and NOW clauses across the board, preempting
the common law rules entirely, is the "schizophrenic ' '23° nature of the
UCC's approach. As should be obvious from the Supreme Court of
North Carolina's treatment of waivers as modifications and vice
versa, the confusion of which has been somewhat alleviated by Justice
Exum's opinion in Rubish v. Wachovia Bank,23 1 courts have had
difficulty reconciling "the left hand, which taketh away the
modification, and the right hand, which giveth a waiver. '232 In some
cases, NOM clauses are enforced literally, both within and outside
Article 2; in others, they are ignored. In still other cases, the courts
have invoked estoppel and waiver theories to prevent parties from
asserting the NOM clauses in their own agreements.233 Unless the
North Carolina appellate courts are prepared to adhere to a far
narrower definition of waiver than their own precedent suggests, it
seems unlikely that the "schizophrenic" effects of NOM clauses will
be mitigated by statutory reform in cases featuring hard facts.
The North Carolina appellate courts have not decided any cases
dealing specifically with the enforceability of NOW, as opposed to
NOM, clauses. As Professor Snyder notes, legal scholarship has given
little attention to NOW clauses as a subject apart from their NOM
sisters. Courts in other states, however, have had to consider the
enforceability of NOW clauses, and as with NOM clauses, have split
230. Douglas K. Newell, Cleaning Up U.C.C. Section 2-209,27 IDAHO L. REV. 487, 489
(1990), cited in Snyder, supra note 3, at 646 n.178.
231. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
232. Snyder, supra note 3, at 646 & nn.179-84. Professor Snyder cites several articles
that in turn collect cases from other states and federal circuits.
233. The touchstone case remains Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters,
781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986), a fractured opinion in which Judges Posner and Easterbrook
split over the proper application of a NOM clause. The Wisconsin Knife majority held
that section 2-209 could not mean that the same action-an attempted oral modification of
an agreement containing a NOM clause-can be ineffective as modification but be
validated under the different label of "waiver." Id. at 1286-87. In Wisconsin Knife, the
court identified reliance as the key element that would "transform a failed modification
into an effective waiver." Snyder, supra note 3, at 646. "[S]cholars have not shown much
more unity on the subject of Section 2-209" than the Seventh Circuit itself. Id. at 646-47
& nn.186-87 (citing the differing views of Professors White and Summers and Professor
Farnsworth). The secondary literature on the subject is extensive and inconclusive; a
number of scholars have proposed reforms to section 2-209. See generally Hillman,
Standards, supra note 5 (discussing principles to guide revisions to Article 2); Eisler, supra
note 26 (proposing "a principled basis for interpreting the modification rules of section 2-
209"); Robert A. Hillman, A Study of Uniform Commercial Code Methodology: Contract
Modification under Article Two, 59 N.C. L. REV. 335 (1981) (suggesting solutions to
inconsistencies and ambiguities in Article 2).
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into several camps. Some courts, adhering closely to the common law
rule, have deemed NOW clauses to be wholly unenforceable. Others
enforce NOW clauses literally, as they are written. Still others deploy
waiver or estoppel theories to defeat NOW clauses. 234 The legislation
proposed below suggests that NOW clauses be treated like NOM
clauses.
Section 29(2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods ("CISG")235 addresses the problem of
NOM and NOW clauses in a single sentence that is far easier to
understand than section 2-209(2) of the UCC.236 This sentence reads
as follows:
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any
modification or termination by agreement to be in writing may
not be otherwise modified or terminated by agreement.
However, a party may be precluded by his conduct from
asserting such a provision to the extent that the other party has
relied on that conduct.237
This provision, with appropriate revisions to embrace NOW
clauses and flesh out the nature of the reliance that would defeat
enforcement, provides an admirable starting point for North Carolina
legislation validating NOM and NOW clauses.2 38 The simplicity of the
CISG's approach opens it to criticism, however, on the ground that it
"leave[s] open the type of 'conduct' and 'reliance' that can bar the
234. See Snyder, supra note 3, at 647-48 & nn.188-205 (collecting and analyzing the
leading cases from other jurisdictions).
235. See Final Act of the U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Official Records, Annex I, at 230, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 9 7/18 (1980), reprinted in
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 668 (1990) [hereinafter CISGI.
236. See Robert A. Hillman, Article 29(2) of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A New Effort at Clarifying the Legal Effects
of "No Oral Modification" Clauses, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 449, 458-63 (1988) (discussing
Article 29(2)'s treatment of NOM clauses).
237. CISG, supra note 235, art. 29(2).
238. Some scholars have espoused the view that the CISG is not an appropriate model
for revision of Article 2 of the UCC. See Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicability of the
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods as a Model for the Revision
of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1995, 2014 (1998)
(stating that inconsistent policy objectives are one of the many reasons why the CISG is an
inappropriate model for Article Two); Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the
U.C.C. and the CISG and the Construction of Uniform Law, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1021,
1022-24 (1996) (suggesting that the interpretive functions of the UCC and CISG are too
different for useful comparison). As noted by Professor Synder, Professor Gabriel does
acknowledge that "the CISG is appropriate for 'selective borrowing.' " Gabriel, supra, at
2014; Snyder, supra note 3, at 671 & n.298.
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assertion of a NOM clause. '239 Fortunately, drafting from whole cloth
is not necessary: Professor Snyder has proposed an inclusive
statutory scheme that addresses nearly all of the issues associated
with NOM and NOW clauses. This statute, which is both more
comprehensive and more complex than the CISG provision,
addresses the problem of reasonable, good faith reliance on a party's
conduct.
I propose the following enabling rule:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a term excluding
modification, rescission, or waiver except by an authenticated
record is binding if the term is expressed in a record
authenticated by the party against whom enforcement of the
term is sought. However, to the extent necessary to avoid
injustice, a party is precluded from asserting the term if the
party's language or conduct induced the other party to change
its position reasonably, materially, and in good faith.24°
239. Hillman, Standards, supra note 5, at 1526.
240. Professor Snyder's proposed statute includes definitions of "course of
performance," "course of dealing," and "usage of trade," each of which can be relevant to
whether a waiver or modification has taken place. Because this Article has examined only
NOM and NOW clauses, it recommends only the portion of Professor Snyder's proposed
statute that validates such clauses. There is considerable merit to Professor Snyder's
entire statutory scheme, however, and as such it is set forth in full below:
§ 1-304. Course of Performance, Course of Dealing, and Usage of Trade.
(a) A 'course of performance' is established between parties to a particular
agreement if:
(1) the agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by a
party;
(2) that party performs on one or more occasions; and
(3) the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the performance
and opportunity to object, accepts the performance or acquiesces in it
without objection.
(b) A 'course of dealing' is established between parties by conduct or
expressions that are fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of
understanding for interpreting their other expressions and other conduct.
(c) A 'usage of trade' is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the agreement in
question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts.
If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a trade code or similar
record the interpretation of the record is a question of law.
(d) A course of performance or course of dealing between the parties or
usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged or of
which they are or should be aware is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of
the parties' agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of the
agreement, and may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement.
(e) The express terms of an agreement and any applicable course of
performance, course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed
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This statute would allow parties to control the manner in which
their agreement can be modified, rescinded, or waived. It recognizes
that NOM and NOW clauses increase the parties' ability to lock in
their deal and are a regular part of modern commercial practice.
Parties will be permitted to insist that changes to an agreement be
memorialized with the same dignity as the original contract. At the
same time, parties will not be allowed to perform the agreement as if
the NOM and NOW clauses did not exist. They will be required to
police their own conduct under the agreement, refraining from
actions that would induce the other party to change its position in
reliance. And even if a party is induced to change its position, the
degree of change must have been reasonable, material, and
undertaken in good faith. This limited reliance exception to a new
statutory rule that NOM and NOW clauses are enforceable would
allow judges to decide cases in accordance with the community's
insistence that courts act "sensibly, wisely, even justly." '241
It may be useful to evaluate the efficacy of this proposed statute
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other. If such a construction is
unreasonable:
(1) express terms prevail over course of performance, course of
dealing, and usage of trade;
(2) course of performance prevails over course of dealing and usage of
trade; and
(3) course of dealing prevails over usage of trade.
(g) Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is not
admissible unless that party has given the other party such notice as the
court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.
§ 1-304A. Modification and Waiver.
(a) An agreement made in good faith that modifies or rescinds a contract
needs no consideration to be binding.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a term excluding
modification, rescission, or waiver except by an authenticated record is
binding if the term is expressed in a record authenticated by the party
against whom enforcement of the term is sought. However, to the extent
necessary to avoid injustice, a party is precluded from asserting the term if
the party's language or conduct induced the other party to change its
position reasonably, materially, and in good faith.
(c) In the absence of a term governed by subsection (b), a waiver made
through course of performance (section 1-304(f)) or otherwise may be
retracted [if the waiver affects an executory portion of the contract] by
giving reasonable notice to the other party that strict performance will be
required, except to the extent retraction would be unjust in view of a
material change in position in reasonable and good faith reliance on the
waiver.
Snyder, supra note 3, at 656-58 (citations omitted). Professor Snyder recommends that
the statute be codified in Article 1 of the UCC.
241. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 17 (1977), quoted in Snyder,
supra note 3, at 655 n.230.
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against a fact pattern that readers of this Article will find familiar: a
common situation involving property owners and contractors.
Assume that A hires B to excavate and grade A's land for a fixed
price. A and B enter into a written contract containing a NOM
clause. B encounters more rock than expected and tells A he wants
to terminate the contract. A, seeking to induce B to stay on the job,
orally promises B to pay more than the original price. B accepts A's
new proposal, which is never put into writing, and rents better, more
expensive equipment to continue the excavation work. B then
demands a progress payment reflecting the price increase. A refuses,
pointing to the NOM clause. B walks off the job. A then sues B on
the original contract and B defends on the basis of the alleged oral
modification.
In the lawsuit, A raises the NOM clause in an effort to defeat B's
oral modification defense and also claims that the alleged oral
modification was not supported by consideration. B asserts his
detrimental reliance (renting better, more expensive equipment) on
A's gratuitous promise as the basis both for defeating the NOM
clause and for enforcing (defensively) a modification that lacks
consideration. A contends that no enforceable promise of a higher
price was made and argues that B would have had to rent better,
more expensive equipment anyway in order to finish the job-in
effect, that there was no detrimental reliance because B's
performance of the excavation work was already bargained for in the
original contract.
Under the statute proposed above, A's assertion of the NOM
clause would defeat B's oral modification defense unless B could
prove (presumably by clear and convincing evidence-the prevailing
standard242) that B's rental of equipment was induced by A's promise
and that B's reliance was reasonable, material, and undertaken in
good faith. B's burden of proof raises questions of fact that would
have to be determined by the jury (or the judge, in the case of a bench
trial).
The reliance exception in the proposed statute contains three
terms that could swallow up the positive goal of giving effect to NOM
and NOW clauses. Allowing the NOM or NOW clause to be avoided
because a party was induced to change its position "reasonably,
materially, and in good faith" should demand that the party seeking
to establish reliance-despite its earlier agreement to the NOM or
242. Snyder, supra note 3, at 662.
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NOW clause-sustain a heavy burden of proof.243 Recognizing that
courts will find a way to compensate reasonable reliance, the General
Assembly should include with the new statute a commentary for the
guidance of judges, articulating standards for determining the
reasonableness, materiality, and bona fides of the reliance. The key
question is whether the party arguing reliance was actually aware, or
should have been aware, of the NOM or NOW clause at the time the
reliance took place. The commentary could note, for example, as
relevant factors for consideration, the size of the transaction, whether
the NOM or NOW clause was a separately negotiated term,
separately signed, or whether it was simply a part of the contract's
"boilerplate" provisions, ignored by the parties and their lawyers.2"
The relative sophistication of the parties-whether they are illiterate
individuals, sole proprietors of businesses or Fortune 500
companies-and prior courses of dealing between them under similar
contracts, could also be important factors for the court's
consideration.245 Parties who wish to be at a lower risk of undesired
changes should provide for separate signature or initialing by their
agents next to the NOM and NOW clauses. To this end, the General
Assembly should also carefully review Professor Snyder's extensive
and helpful suggestions for courts, lawyers, and clients who might
seek to take advantage of a statute enforcing NOM and NOW
clauses.246
243. Snyder, supra note 3, at 662. The burden should be proof by "clear and
convincing" evidence, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence.
244. Snyder, supra note 3, at 664.
245. Snyder, supra note 3, at 665.
246. Snyder, supra note 3, at 660-69 nn.250-95 and accompanying text. Professor
Snyder goes on to recommend a "coercion standard" for judging contract modifications
that he recommends appear in the comments to the revised UCC, or that courts adopt as a
part of the common law. Snyder, supra note 3, at 677-85 nn.329-52 and accompanying
text.
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